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Financial Impact of the Opioid Crisis on Local 
Government: Quantifying Costs for Litigation and 
Policymaking 
Elizabeth Weeks* & Paula Sanford** 
Abstract: The opioid epidemic has had a significant impact on 
individuals and communities, including local governments responsible 
for serving and protecting those affected individuals. This is the first 
study of its kind to consider whether those local government costs are 
quantifiable, a question that has salience both for pending opioid 
litigation in federal and state courts and for local planning and budgeting 
decisions.  This Article first provides a detailed description of the opioid 
litigation landscape, including the federal multidistrict litigation (MDL) 
in Ohio, the Native American tribes’ actions, and various procedural and 
other hurdles that local government plaintiffs face in seeking monetary 
recovery in court.  The Article also provides a literature review of 
existing studies on the financial impacts of the opioid epidemic, noting 
the shortcomings of those studies in regards to quantifying costs for local 
governments.  Finally, it describes our study methodology, which 
involved unstructured, qualitative interviews with local government 
department heads and other service providers to determine the extent to 
which their opioid costs could be readily captured.  Our findings reveal 
that some costs are easy to track and correlate with opioids, specifically, 
and we provide sample calculations for some of those; other costs are not 
currently tracked as opioid-specific but could be with additional effort, 
an effort we intend to undertake with future stages of this project; and 
still other costs are very hard to disaggregate or quantify, although they 
are very real and, often, significant. 
I. INTRODUCTION 
This Article examines the financial impact of the opioid crisis on local 
governments, relevant to their posture both as litigants seeking damages 
from opioid manufacturers, distributors, and pharmacies,1 and as stewards 
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 1.   See, e.g., Michael Kilpatrick Morton, Making the Victim Whole Again? State and Local 
Governments Seek to Hold Drug Companies Accountable for Holes Left in their Communities and 
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of public monies making informed decisions about how best to address the 
epidemic going forward.  According to the CDC, between 1999 and 2016, 
more than half a million people died from drug overdose.2  On average, 
130 Americans die every day from an opioid overdose.3  In 2017, President 
Trump officially declared the opioid problem a public health emergency.4  
Former U.S. Attorney General Jeff Sessions noted the substantial burden 
the opioid crisis has had on federal resources, having already cost the 
government $115 billion in 2017 and $1 trillion since 2001 and predicting 
an additional $500 billion in opioid-related costs over the next three years.5  
In the State of Georgia, “[t]he health care costs associated with opioid 
misuse . . . were estimated at $447 million in 2007,” and projected to 
increase by eighty percent since then.6  Likewise, “the cost of opioid-
related inpatient care more than doubled [between 2002 and 2012], rising 
to $15 billion in 2012.”7 
This Article’s observations and conclusions regarding how local 
governments might track and address the opioid epidemic draw on the 
authors’ local government and health care finance expertise, further 
informed by unstructured, qualitative interviews with local government 
officials and administrators for private organizations in select Georgia 
counties.8  The interviews were not intended to gather statistically 
significant, hypothesis-driven data, or even hard numbers for the counties 
surveyed, but rather to reality check the authors’ assumptions about the 
                                                          
Budgets, ABA (Sept. 27, 2018), https://www.americanbar.org/groups/health_law/publications/ 
aba_health_esource/2017-2018/january2018/makingthevictim/ [https://perma.cc/7YTX-TELR]. 
 2.   Understanding the Epidemic, CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL AND PREVENTION, 
https://www.cdc.gov/drugoverdose/epidemic/index.html [https://perma.cc/DED8-V3EC] (last 
updated Dec. 19, 2018).   
 3.   Id. 
 4.   Combatting the National Drug Demand and Opioid Crisis: Memorandum for the Heads of 
Exec. Dep’ts and Agencies, 82 Fed. Reg. 50,305 (Oct. 26, 2017). 
 5.   Att’y Gen. Jeff Sessions, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Attorney General Sessions Delivers Remarks 
Announcing the Prescription Interdiction and Litigation Task Force (Feb. 27, 2018), 
https://www.justice.gov/opa/speech/attorney-general-sessions-delivers-remarks-announcing-
prescription-interdiction-and [https://perma.cc/C2EE-A8VB] (citing Economic Toll of Opioid Crisis 
in U.S. Exceeded $1 Trillion Since 2001, ALTARUM (Feb. 13, 2018), https://altarum.org/ 
news/economic-toll-opioid-crisis-us-exceeded-1-trillion-2001 [https://perma.cc/F39A-SLGQ]); see 
also Katie Benner & Jan Hoffman, Justice Dept. Backs High-Stakes Lawsuit Against Opioid Makers, 
N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 27, 2018), http://www.nytimes.com/2018/02/27/us/politics/justice-department-
opioid-lawsuit.html [https://perma.cc/LM48-9SMH]. 
 6.   SUBSTANCE ABUSE RESEARCH ALLIANCE (SARA), GEORGIA PREVENTION PROJECT, 
PRESCRIPTION OPIOIDS AND HEROIN EPIDEMIC IN GEORGIA – A WHITE PAPER 7 (2017), 
http://www.senate.ga.gov/sro/Documents/ 
StudyCommRpts/OpioidsAppendix.pdf [https://perma.cc/72FV-EPCZ]. 
 7.   Id. 
 8.   See infra Part IV. 
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actual and potential financial impact of the opioid crisis on local 
governments and the feasibility of quantifying those impacts. 
The results reveal that a relatively discrete set of opioid-related costs 
are fairly easy to identify and quantify, such as labor and supply costs for 
court administration and coroners and costs related to naloxone, an opioid 
antagonist.  But many other opioid-related expenditures, including law 
enforcement, jail, and other judicial-branch services, will be more difficult 
for local governments to accurately and comprehensively capture unless 
tailored tracking tools, software, coding methodologies, or spreadsheets 
are employed.  Finally, we note a host of costs on local communities 
arising out of the opioid epidemic that will be hard to quantify, such as lost 
productivity, quality of life, and lost economic opportunity. 
The opioid multidistrict litigation (MDL), which includes numerous 
local government plaintiffs, was the impetus for this study, but our 
research has multiple aims and audiences.  First, it helps inform the 
damages calculation in the lawsuits, which very likely will be resolved by 
settlement, without reaching the merits of the allegations.9  The three 
counties included in the study are litigants and will be called upon to 
provide much more detailed discovery responses than our unstructured 
interviews.  Second, it assesses the usefulness of existing “macro” 
(national) studies on the financial impact of opioids for determining costs 
on a “micro” (local) level.  Existing cost studies extrapolate health care, 
lost productivity, and law enforcement costs from mortality and other data, 
but those results are very difficult to translate to any meaningful numbers 
for a particular city or county.  Third, it examines structural and resource 
limits and other obstacles that local governments face in capturing the 
costs from the opioid epidemic.  Fourth, the study supports local 
governments’ informed decisionmaking regarding resource allocation and 
strategies to address the opioid crisis in the future. 
This Article proceeds as follows: Part II provides background on the 
opioids lawsuits and need for this cost study.  Part III describes existing 
studies of the opioid epidemic’s financial impact and notes the limits of 
those studies to address the question presented here.  Part IV describes the 
study methodology and findings.  Part V concludes, assessing the study’s 
implications and describing the authors’ workplan for assisting local 
governments address the identified challenges. 
                                                          
 9.   See, e.g., Amanda Bronstad, Litigation No Substitute for Settlement, Says Opioid MDL 
Judge, NAT’L L.J. (May 10, 2018, 2:18 PM), https://www.law.com/national 
lawjournal/2018/05/10/litigation-no-substitute-for-settlement-says-opioid-mdl-judge/?slreturn=2018 
0916131359. 
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II. BACKGROUND 
This Part describes the litigation that provoked this study of costs that 
local governments may be experiencing due to the opioid epidemic in their 
communities.  As noted above, this study is not aimed exclusively at the 
legal damages question but takes a broader and longer-range view, 
relevant for city and county budget and planning purposes.  Nevertheless, 
it is helpful to understand the legal landscape, including prior rounds of 
opioid litigation; parties to the present actions; theories of recovery 
alleged; defenses asserted; damages sought; procedural developments, 
especially the consolidation of the cases at least for pretrial purposed in a 
federal MDL; parallel actions, most notably the Native American tribes’ 
actions; and the progress of these cases toward trial or settlement. 
A. Opioid Lawsuits 
Amid myriad strategies to address the opioid crisis in the United 
States, the massive MDL in the Northern District of Ohio figures 
prominently.10  A number of cities, counties, townships, fire districts, 
tribal governments, third-party payors, health care providers, individuals, 
and states have filed lawsuits against prescription drug manufacturers, 
distributors, pharmacies, pharmacy benefit managers, as well as some non-
profit organizations, individual experts, and family owners of 
pharmaceutical companies.11 
1. Allegations and Responses 
Defendants include pharmaceutical giants such as Johnson & Johnson 
and Purdue Pharma, large distributors such as McKesson and Cardinal 
Health, pharmacy chains such as CVS, Rite Aid, and Walgreens, and 
physicians who prescribe the drugs.12  The local government plaintiffs’ 
complaints are fairly similar, including claims for public nuisance, 
violations of Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act 
(RICO),13 negligence per se, and negligence and negligent 
                                                          
 10.   In re Nat’l Prescription Opiate Litig., No. 17-2804 (N.D. Ohio 2017); Jan Hoffman, Can 
this Judge Solve the Opioid Crisis?, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 5, 2018), http://www.nytimes.com/ 
2018/03/05/health/opioid-crisis-judge-lawsuits.html [https://perma.cc/RM64-8EHT].  
 11.   Abbe R. Gluck et al., Civil Litigation and the Opioid Epidemic: The Role of Courts in a 
National Health Crisis, 46 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 351, 354–57 (2018); Erich Eiselt, Too Much of a Bad 
Thing: Municipalities and the Opioid Curse, 59 MUN. LAW. 6, 10–11 (2018). 
 12.   Gluck et al., supra note 11, at 355–56. 
 13.   18 U.S.C. § 1961 (2012 & Supp. 2017). 
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misrepresentation.14  The complaints further assert claims of fraud and 
fraudulent misrepresentation, false advertising, or violation of legal duties 
owed to the plaintiffs under state and federal statutes.15  The public 
nuisance claim—”anything that interferes with rights that are held in 
common by the general public including public health and safety”—tracks 
one of the key claims by states against tobacco companies in the 1990s.16 
The plaintiffs allege that pharmaceutical manufacturers downplayed 
the addictiveness of the drugs,17 and engaged in misleading and 
“aggressive marketing tactics, quotas for representatives, and financial 
kickbacks for doctors” to promote the painkillers.18  Specifically, the 
plaintiffs allege that the manufacturers “pushed highly addictive, 
dangerous opioids, falsely representing to doctors that patients would only 
rarely succumb to drug addiction” persuaded doctors to prescribe . . . 
opioids, which turned patients into drug addicts for their own corporate 
profit.”19  The allegations against pharmacies and distributors are for 
breach of their legal duties under federal and state law to monitor, detect, 
investigate, refuse, and report suspicious orders that may indicate that the 
drugs were being abused, essentially acting as an accessory to the crime.20  
Moreover, government plaintiffs at the city, county, and state levels also 
attribute opioid use as the cause of negative effects on public health and 
safety.21  These include costs for “providing treatment for overdoses, 
counseling and rehabilitation services, . . . costs associated with providing 
care for children whose parents suffer from opioid-related disability,” 
increases in drug-related crimes like theft and assault, and increase in costs 
of law enforcement and other public services.22  Finally, claims against 
doctors revolve around unnecessary prescriptions, when the pain could 
have been managed in other ways, or unnecessary refills.23 
                                                          
 14.   See Complaint and Demand for Jury Trial, Augusta Cnty. v. Amerisourcebergen Drug Corp., 
No. 1:18-cv-00029 (S.D. Ga. Feb. 13, 2018), ECF No. 1 [hereinafter Augusta Complaint]; Complaint 
and Demand for Jury Trial, Jackson Cnty. v. Amerisourcebergen Drug Corp., No. 1:18-op-45581 
(N.D. Ohio May 15, 2018), ECF No. 1; Complaint and Demand for Jury Trial, Crisp Cnty. v. 
Amerisourcebergen Drug Corp., No. 1:18-cv-00036 (M.D. Ga. Feb. 14, 2018), ECF No. 1.  
 15.   See complaints cited supra note 14. 
 16.   Gluck et al., supra note 11, at 355. 
 17.   Benner & Hoffman, supra note 5. 
 18.   Why Does Class-Action Defense Spending Continue to Rise?, ESQUIRE (May 10, 2018), 
https://www.esquiresolutions.com/why-does-class-action-defense-spending-continue-to-rise/ 
[https://perma.cc/YH3F-ZQTH] . 
 19.   Augusta Complaint, supra note 14, at 2. 
 20.   E.g., id. at 65–66. 
 21.   Augusta Complaint, supra note 14, at 3. 
 22.   Id.  
 23.   See Gluck et al., supra note 11, at 354. 
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Plaintiff lawyers also have filed lawsuits on behalf of infants with an 
addiction-related syndrome.24  Those attorneys have sought to separate 
their claims from the MDL, arguing that their claims involve distinct 
issues and call for faster resolution, so that the affected babies can receive 
financial support for the services that they will require.25 
Responding to the claims, drug companies have acknowledged the 
public health crisis but denied liability and sought dismissal of the 
lawsuits.26  For instance, the defendants argued that the “[r]acketeering 
claims should be dismissed because injury to business or property was not 
alleged,” and public nuisance claims did not allege a “public right with 
which distributors interfered.”27  The manufacturers also argued that they 
have “extensively disclosed the risks . . . and that the [FDA] approved the 
drugs’ marketing,”28 which may raise the potential issue of federal 
preemption.29  Distributors asserted that they “neither market[ed] nor 
prescribe[d] opioids,” and the alleged misconduct of failing to monitor and 
report suspicious orders was “too indirect” to support a claim.30  
Moreover, distributors also contended that emphasis should not be placed 
on the aggregate number of prescriptions distributed by all distributors, 
since each of them “are not aware of the amounts of drugs shipped by their 
competitors . . . and therefore aggregate data cannot constitute a ‘red 
flag.’”31  Physicians can be expected to defend the allegations by asserting 
that their prescribing was within the standard of care and that they gave 
appropriate warnings to patients. 
2. Multidistrict Litigation 
As of December 2017, over two hundred prescription opioid cases had 
been filed in federal courts across the country.32  As of February 2018, 
                                                          
 24.   John O’Brien, Blame the Criminals, Pharmacies Facing Opioid Lawsuits Say, FORBES (June 
7, 2018, 1:22 PM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/legalnewsline/2018/06/07/lets-blame-the-criminals-
pharmacies-facing-opioid-litigation-say/#265045ba64b8 [https://perma.cc/5EZR-TA9U].  
 25.   Associated Press, Babies Born in Withdrawal New Complication in Opioid Cases, VOA 
(Nov. 29, 2018, 3:40 PM), https://www.voanews.com/a/babies-born-in-withdrawal-new-
complication-in-opioid-cases/4680172.html [https://perma.cc/8WDP-HW8F]. 
 26.   See O’Brien, supra note 24.  
 27.   Id.  
 28.   Andrew Harris et al., Justice for Opioid Communities Means Massive Payday for Their 
Lawyers, BLOOMBERG (July 25, 2018), https://www.bloomberg.com/graphics/2018-opioid-
lawsuits/?srnd=prognosis.  
 29.   Id. 
 30.   Id.  
 31.   Gluck et al., supra note 11, at 357. 
 32.   Id. at 359. 
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cities, counties, and Native American tribes nationwide filed more than 
four hundred complaints.33  As of June 2018, the number rose to more than 
seven hundred.34  In December 2017, over two hundred prescription opioid 
cases filed in federal courts across the country were consolidated in the 
federal MDL.35  MDL is a device under federal law that allows “civil 
actions involving one or more common questions of fact . . . pending in 
different districts”36 to be consolidated for more efficient pretrial handling, 
including discovery.37  The federal judicial panel on MDL decides whether 
the cases should be consolidated and, if so, to which court the cases should 
be transferred.  MDL is distinct from federal class action in that “[a] case 
proceeds as a class action only if its proponents show that the claims meet 
the requirements of commonality, typicality, adequacy of representation, 
and—for money damages class actions under [Federal Rule of Civil 
Procedure] 23(b)(3)—predominance of common issues over individual 
issues.”38  MDL does not join parties for common or representative 
litigation but may have the effect of facilitating collective resolution of the 
claims.39  There is debate over the relative merits of MDL versus class 
action from efficiency and fairness perspectives,40 and even greater 
concern about forcing the parties into a mandatory class action, a step that 
some have speculated that Judge Polster would pursue.41 
The state and local government plaintiffs, for their part, urged the 
federal opioids MDL, asserting that their contention against opioid 
manufacturers and distributors regarding breach of their duty to monitor, 
detect, investigate, refuse, and report suspicious orders of prescription 
                                                          
 33.   Benner & Hoffman, supra note 5.  
 34.   Gluck et al., supra note 11, at 351–52, 355.  
 35.   In re Nat’l Prescription Opiate Litig., 290 F. Supp. 3d 1375 (U.S. Jud. Pan. Mult. Lit. 2017); 
see also Hoffman, supra note 10. 
 36.   28 U.S.C. § 1407(a) (2012). 
 37.   Lexecon Inc. v. Milberg Weiss Bershad Hynes & Lerach, 523 U.S. 26, 39–40 (1998) 
(pointing to legislative history indicating that the statute applies only to pretrial stages); see Elizabeth 
Chamblee Burch, Monopolies in Multidistrict Litigation, 70 VAND. L. REV. 67, 72 n.13 (2017).  As a 
reality, however, cases rarely are returned to their original jurisdictions. 
 38.   Howard M. Erichson, What MDL and Class Actions Have in Common, 70 VAND. L. REV. 
EN BANC 29, 37 &  n.34 (2017) (first citing FED. R. CIV. P. 23(a)(2)–(4), 23(b)(3); then citing Wal-
Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 564 U.S. 338 (2011); and then citing Amchem Prods. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 
591 (1997)). 
 39.   Id. at 38. 
 40.   Compare Burch, supra note 37, with Erichson, supra note 38, at 30 (summarizing Burch’s 
arguments). 
 41.   E.g., Daniel Fisher, Opioid Lawyers Say Settlement May Hinge on Forcing Plaintiffs into 
Class Action, FORBES (Sept. 27, 2018, 6:00 AM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/legalnewsline/ 
2018/09/27/opioid-lawyers-say-settlement-may-hinge-on-forcing-plaintiffs-into-class-action/#2bde0 
4451d1c [https://perma.cc/23FW-GGLN]. 
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opiates presents a common question of fact, thus meeting one of the 
requirements for creating an MDL.42  Judge Polster was selected to preside 
because of his depth of experience in MDL cases, Ohio’s extensive impact 
from the opioid crisis, and the court’s proximity to a number of 
defendants.43  Ohio, like West Virginia, Pennsylvania, New Hampshire, 
and the District of Columbia, is Ground Zero for the opioid crisis.44  In 
some of these communities manufacturers shipped as many as ten 
thousand pills per day to a single pharmacy,45 many prescribed through 
“pill mills” and diverted to other users through illicit sales. 
As of March 2018, at least twelve counties in Georgia had filed 
lawsuits against opioid manufacturers and distributors.46  Those cases 
were quickly pulled into the MDL.  The number of Georgia counties, 
cities, and hospital authorities filing opioids lawsuits rose to forty as of 
May 2018,47 and to nearly seventy (out of 159 counties) as of August 17, 
2018.48  The claims in the Georgia lawsuits closely track the allegations 
listed above.  With respect to damages, the Georgia complaints seek 
recovery for: 
 
(1) costs for providing medical care, additional therapeutic, and 
prescription drug purchases, and other treatments for patients suffering 
from opioid-related addiction or disease, including overdoses and deaths; 
(2) costs for providing treatment, counseling, and rehabilitation services; 
(3) costs for providing treatment of infants born with opioid-related 
medical conditions; 
(4) costs associated with law enforcement and public safety relating to 
                                                          
 42.   Courtney Hessler, Consolidation of 66 Opioid Suits Requested, HERALD DISPATCH (Oct. 5, 
2017), http://www.herald-dispatch.com/news/consolidation-of-opioid-suits-requested/article_9c4df 
826-c6a6-58fd-9ba8-ac6058aaf2ad.html [https://perma.cc/7ZH3-KVXL]. 
 43.   Id. 
 44.   Drug Overdose Deaths, CENTERS FOR DISEASE CONTROL AND PREVENTION (Dec. 19, 
2018), https://www.cdc.gov/drugoverdose/data/statedeaths.html [https://perma.cc/XD77-UU3K] 
(stating that in 2017 Ohio had the second highest rates of overdoses deaths per 100,000). 
 45.   See Eiselt, supra note 11; H. Energy & Commerce Comm., Red Flags and Warning Signs 
Ignored: Opioid Distribution and Enforcement Concerns in West Virginia, H. Energy & Commerce 
Comm. 115th Cong. 225 (Dec. 18, 2018). 
 46.   Nick Bowman, Hall Among 12 Georgia Counties Suing Opioid Manufacturers, 
GAINESVILLE TIMES (Mar. 16, 2018, 8:36 AM), https://www.gainesvilletimes.com/news/hall-among-
12-georgia-counties-filing-suit-against-opioid-manufacturers/ [https://perma.cc/783U-TFR9]. 
 47.   Toombs County Files Lawsuit Against Opioid Manufacturers and Distributors, SE. GA. 
TODAY (May 15, 2018), http://southeastgeorgiatoday.com/index.php/archived-newsbreaks/73351-
opioid-lawsuit-filed [https://perma.cc/Q4FK-A7GQ]. 
 48.   Jeremy Redmon, Atlanta-area Governments Sue Opioid Industry Amid Deadly Epidemic, 
ATLANTA J. CONST. (Aug. 17, 2018), https://www.ajc.com/news/state—regional-govt—
politics/atlanta-area-governments-sue-opioid-industry-amid-deadly-epidemic/7gtOHvSktNOI4hjoSu 
9njI/ [https://perma.cc/NC4Y-8FZ5]. 
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the opioid epidemic; and 
(5) costs associated with providing care for children whose parents suffer 
from opioid-related disability or incapacitation.49 
 
As explained further below, only a fraction of these costs are truly 
local—as opposed to state, federal, or private—and, even among those 
costs that actually fall on city and county governments, the costs are very 
difficult to capture as related to opioids, specifically, as opposed to other 
multi-drug use or other conflating factors.  In addition, there are a host of 
other costs for local governments not alleged in the list above.  Those, too, 
however, may be difficult to quantify. 
3. Local Government Litigants 
It bears emphasis that the posture of the lawsuits, with local 
governmental units as plaintiffs, is somewhat unusual.  First, why not 
individual patients or their surviving family members, as in other 
pharmaceutical products liability cases?50  Second, why not states, as in 
the tobacco litigation in the 1990s?51  Regarding the first question, some 
answers can be gleaned from the first wave of opioid litigation in the early 
2000s, against Purdue Pharma regarding OxyContin.52  Those cases were 
brought by individuals, as well as states’ attorneys general, regarding the 
highly lucrative, extended release drug, which was marketed as being less 
addictive because the timed release that purportedly did not produce the 
same “highs” as earlier products.53  The plaintiffs in that waive of litigation 
alleged a “wide array of legal theories, including strict products liability, 
fraud, negligence, breach of implied warranty, conspiracy, and violations 
of state consumer protection statutes.”54  Purdue defended those lawsuits 
aggressively and, for the most part, successfully.  Purdue asserted several 
arguments that tripped up the plaintiffs, including blaming the plaintiffs 
themselves for abusing the products and thus coming to the court with 
                                                          
 49.   See Augusta Complaint, supra note 14, at 3. 
 50.   See, e.g., Young K. Lee, Beyond Gatekeeping: Class Certification, Judicial Oversight, and 
the Promotion of Scientific Research in “Immature” Pharmaceutical Torts, 105 COLUM. L. REV. 
1905, 1911–15 (cataloguing various pharmaceutical torts cases, including class actions). 
 51.   Master Settlement Agreement, PUB. HEALTH L. CTR., http://publichealthlawcenter.org/ 
topics/tobacco-control/tobacco-control-litigation/master-settlement-agreement [https://perma.cc/ 
T45E-3XNZ] (last visited Apr. 8, 2019). 
 52.   See Gluck et al., supra note 11, at 353. 
 53.   Id. 
 54.   Id. 
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unclean hands;55 contributory negligence, again regarding the plaintiffs’ 
own behaviors and fault;56 and intervening causes, including both the 
patients’ and prescribing physicians’ conduct, under the learned 
intermediary doctrine,57 which provides that the manufacturer’s duty to 
warn is satisfied if conveyed to the prescribing physician, even if not to 
the patient.58  Suits by local government units avoid some of those 
individual facts, which raise causation and fault-based obstacles to 
recovery. 
Although Purdue Pharma successfully defended against civil liability 
in the OxyContin lawsuits, it did face criminal liability in 2002.  The U.S. 
Attorney for the Western District of Virginia launched a criminal 
investigation against Purdue alleging misbranding of OxyContin as 
difficult to abuse, less addictive, and providing “fewer peaks and valleys” 
than other opioids.59  Ultimately, Purdue pleaded guilty to those charges,60  
and three Purdue executives were barred “for 20 years from doing business 
with Medicare or other taxpayer-financed health care program.”61  Purdue 
paid “more than $600 million to federal and state agencies.”62 
With respect to the second question, cities and counties may have 
stepped up as plaintiffs precisely to avoid the outcome of the tobacco 
litigation.  That case concluded in 1998 with a Master Settlement 
Agreement (MSA) among “46 states, five U.S. territories, and the District 
of Columbia against the five largest cigarette manufacturers in America 
concerning the advertising, marketing and promotion of cigarettes.”63  The 
MSA represented the largest civil settlement to date, awarding $206 billion 
to the states over twenty-five years.64  As Professor Micah Berman 
                                                          
 55.   Id. 
 56.   Id. at 358. 
 57.   Id. at 353. 
 58.   RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PROD. LIAB. § 6(d)(1) (AM. LAW INST. 1998). 
 59.   Press Release, FDA, FDA Announces Results of Investigation into Illegal Promotion of 
OxyContin by the Purdue Frederick Company, Inc. (May 10, 2007, revised May 14, 2007) available 
at https://web.archive.org/web/20080221180830/http://www.fda.gov/bbs/topics/NEWS/2007/NEW 
01632.html.  
 60.   Edgar Aliferov, Note, The Role of Direct-Injury Government-Entity Lawsuits in the Opioid 
Litigation, 87 FORDHAM L. REV. 1141, 1151 (2018). 
 61.   Barry Meier, Ruling Is Upheld Against Executives Tied to Oxycontin, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 
15, 2010), https://www.nytimes.com/2010/12/16/business/16purdue.html [https://perma.cc/6MG5-
DT5L]. 
 62.   Paul D. Frederickson, Criminal Marketing: Corporate and Managerial Liability in the 
Prescription Drug Industry, 22 MIDWEST L.J. 115, 115 (2008). 
 63.   Master Settlement Agreement, supra note 51. 
 64.   Bruce Yandle et al., Bootleggers, Baptists & Televangelists: Regulating Tobacco by 
Litigation, 2008 U. ILL. L. REV. 1225, 1227, 1270 (2008); see Margaret A. Little, A Most Dangerous 
Indiscretion: The Legal, Economic, and Political Legacy of the Governments’ Tobacco Litigation, 33 
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explains more thoroughly in his article on this issue, nothing in the MSA 
expressly required states to spend those settlement dollars on public health, 
and states have, and continue to, put those funds toward a variety of 
purposes, plowing much of it into state general revenues and chipping 
away at tobacco-related trust funds to balance state budgets.65  Seeking to 
avoid a similar outcome of settlement dollars failing to reach the 
communities actually impacted by the opioid crisis, local governments 
may be eager to step up as plaintiffs this time around, thus ensuring that 
any funds come directly to their affected communities.66 
4. Comparing Forums 
While those points may explain why local governments figure 
prominently as litigants in the opioid lawsuits, they do not explain why 
those plaintiffs appear to welcome the MDL.  The defendants are facing 
parallel litigation in state courts from a variety of plaintiffs.  The 
defendants and at least some of the plaintiffs, however, seem to prefer the 
MDL.  Some state lawsuits are brought by consumers as state class actions, 
claiming “higher [insurance] premiums, deductibles, and co-payments 
[]because of effects attributable to the opioid epidemic.”67  In addition, 
attorneys general in six states—Texas, Florida, Nevada, North Carolina, 
North Dakota, and Tennessee—filed lawsuits against Purdue Pharma in 
state courts for violation of their respective states’ Deceptive Trade 
Practice Acts.68  After holding back for several months and through the 
November 2018 midterm elections, Georgia’s Attorney General filed the 
state’s opioid lawsuit in Gwinnett County Superior Court in January 
                                                          
CONN. L. REV. 1143, 1143 (2001). 
 65.   See generally Micah Berman, Using Opioid Settlement Proceeds for Public Health: Lessons 
from the Tobacco Experience, 67 U. KAN. L. REV. 1029 (2019) (comparing issues with the tobacco 
MSA with a potential opioid litigation settlement); see also TOBACCO FREE KIDS, BROKEN PROMISES 
TO OUR CHILDREN: A STATE-BY-STATE LOOK AT THE 1998 TOBACCO SETTLEMENT 20 YEARS LATER 
1 (2018), https://www.tobaccofreekids.org/what-we-do/us/statereport [https://perma.cc/665T-
WVM4] (“In the current budget year, Fiscal Year 2019, the states will collect $27.3 billion from the 
settlement and taxes.  But they will spend only 2.4 percent of it – $655 million – on programs to 
prevent kids from smoking and help smokers quit.”). 
 66.   See Gluck et al., supra note 11, at 355. 
 67.   Mark A. York, New York And Other State Court Opioid Litigation Moves Forward Along 
With Federal Opiate Rx MDL 2804, MASS TORT NEXUS (June 11, 2018), 
http://www.masstortnexus.com/mass-torts-news/new-york-and-other-state-court-opioid-litigation-
moves-forward-along-with-federal-opiate-rx-mdl-2804/ [https://perma.cc/HB7P-AZH9]. 
 68.   John C. Moritz, 6 States Sue Maker of OxyContin as They Battle Expenses, Human Costs of 
Opioid Crisis, USA TODAY (May 16, 2018, 8:37 AM), https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/nation-
now/2018/05/15/six-attorney-generals-opioid-lawsuits/612721002/ [https://perma.cc/EL7V-SN2C]. 
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One state, West Virginia, sued a different defendant from the opioid 
manufacturers, distributors, and pharmacies.  On November 2, 2017, the 
state filed a federal court lawsuit against the Joint Commission on 
Accreditation of Health Care Organization (“The Joint Commission”), 
blaming the Commission’s standards for contributing to the epidemic.70  
The Joint Commission is a non-profit organization that certifies 21,000 
health care organizations nationwide and sets standards for those 
organizations to adhere.71  West Virginia alleged that The Joint 
Commission colluded with Purdue Pharma in producing its Pain 
Management Standards,72 which are viewed as largely responsible for 
“bringing questions about pain into every routine patient encounter,” and, 
moreover, that Purdue and other companies funded the report.73 
Although some states have filed in federal courts,74 by and large state 
attorneys general seem to be electing state courts, keeping the cases local 
and close to their constituents where any positive resolution will have 
maximum political impact.  Moreover, U.S. Supreme Court precedent 
clarifies that states suing in their parens patriae powers cannot be removed 
to federal court on personal jurisdiction grounds.75  Recognizing that, the 
opioid defendants have asserted that the claims necessarily involve federal 
questions under the Controlled Substances Act (CSA) and Food and Drug 
Administration (FDA) statutes, thus requiring removal.76 
In general, large defendants tend to prefer consolidation and often 
remove state cases to federal courts so that “there is a single legal 
                                                          
 69.   Press Release, OFFICE OF THE ATT’Y GEN. CHRIS CARR, Carr Announces Lawsuit Against 
Opioid Manufacturers and Distributors (Jan. 3, 2019), https://law.georgia.gov/press-releases/2019-
01-03/carr-announces-lawsuit-against-opioid-manufacturers-and-distributors 
[https://perma.cc/ADG8-832W]. 
 70.   See Complaint, City of Charleston v. Joint Comm’n on Accreditation of Health Care Orgs., 
No. 17-4267 (S.D.W.Va. 2017), ECF No. 1. 
 71.   About the Joint Commission, THE JOINT COMMISSION, https://www.jointcommission.org/ 
about_us/about_the_joint_commission_main.aspx [https://perma.cc/E9FQ-4KVG] (last visited Apr. 
17 2019).  
 72.   David W. Baker, The Joint Commission’s Pain Standards: Origins and Evolution, THE 
JOINT COMMISSION (2017), https://www.jointcommission.org/assets/1/6/Pain_Std_History_ 
Web_Version_05122017.pdf [https://perma.cc/HSB9-2Q7Q].  
 73.   See Gluck et al., supra note 11, at 356–57. 
 74.   Id. at 351–53.  
 75.   Mississippi ex rel. Hood v. AU Optronics Corp., 571 U.S. 161, 176 (2014) (holding that a 
suit by the State of Mississippi, as the sole plaintiff, was not a removable “mass action” for purposes 
of the Class Action Fairness Act).  
 76.   See Complaint at 164, Unified Gov’t of Athens-Clark County v. Amerisourcebergen Drug 
Corp., No. 3:18-cv-00015 (M.D. Ga. Feb. 7, 2018) (alleging negligence per se based on duties flowing 
from the Controlled Substances Act); see also Gluck et al., supra note 11, at 359 (discussing cases 
where defendants requested removal based on underlying federal issues).  
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battlefield, and they are not subject to the vagaries of state-court juries 
across the country.”77  For perhaps the same reasons, states and other 
plaintiffs have resisted being pulled into federal MDL for “fear of losing 
leverage amid such a large number of cases.”78  They may expect “better 
results with focused lawsuits in state court” against one or two defendants, 
where “many states already have won large settlements from other drug 
manufacturers with deceptive marketing claims.”79  Thus, a local venue 
may be preferable.  As of August 2018, Alabama was the only state to join 
the MDL.80 
That said, states, as well as the federal government, seem to recognize 
the momentum building behind Judge Polster’s push for settlement at the 
MDL.  In February 2018, the U.S. Department of Justice filed a statement 
of interest81 in the federal lawsuits, emphasizing the government’s 
“substantial costs and significant interest in addressing the opioid 
epidemic.”82  In August 2018, thirty-four states and the District of 
Columbia filed amicus briefs in the Ohio MDL, emphasizing the states’ 
“unique role” in protecting its citizens’ interests.83  In both instances, the 
federal and state governments want to make sure they have a seat at the 
table should discussions on how to slice the settlement pie get underway. 
Local governments, by contrast, seem much more willing, and even 
anxious, to join the MDL.  One reason may be choice of law, in particular, 
avoiding unfavorable state law.  One notable doctrine is the municipal cost 
recovery rule,84 or, as it is called in Georgia, the free public services 
                                                          
 77.   Ty E. Howard & Scarlett Singleton Nokes, ‘Opioids and Legal Enforcement—A Primer’, 
BRADLEY (July 17, 2018), https://www.bradley.com/insights/publications/2018/07/opioids-and-legal-
enforcement-a-primer. 
 78.   Id. 
 79.   Daniel Fisher, Latest Wave of State Opioid Lawsuits Shows Diverging Strategies and 
Lawyer Pay Scales, FORBES (May 29, 2018, 05:34 AM), https://www.forbes.com/ 
sites/legalnewsline/2018/05/29/latest-wave-of-state-opioid-lawsuits-shows-diverging-strategies-and-
lawyer-pay-scales/#43133e166d1d [https://perma.cc/8ZCD-M9YL]. 
 80.   Amanda Bronstad, 35 AGs File Amicus Briefs Citing a State’s ‘Unique Role’ in Fixing the 




 81.   Statement of Interest, In re Nat’l Prescription Opiate Litig., No. 17-2804 (N.D. Ohio 2017), 
ECF No. 161. 
 82.   Id. at 1. 
 83.   Brief for the States of Arizona et. al, as Amicus Curiae in Support of the State of Alabama’s 
Opposition to the Manufacturer Defendants’ Joint Motion to Dismiss the First Amended Complaint at 
1, In re Nat’l Prescription Opiate Litig., No. 17-2804 (N.D. Ohio 2017), ECF No. 874. 
 84.   E.g., City of Philadelphia v. Beretta U.S.A., Corp., 126 F. Supp. 2d 882, 894–95  (E.D. Pa. 
2000), aff’d, 277 F.3d 415 (3d Cir. 2002) (holding that, under the doctrine, city and organizational 
plaintiffs could not bring an action against gun manufacturers, claiming that the gun industry’s 
1074 KANSAS LAW REVIEW Vol. 67 
doctrine.85  The doctrine essentially provides that local governments 
cannot recover tort damages for public services that they are supposed to 
be providing anyway, such as fire and police protection.86  State laws vary 
on the strength of the doctrine, but the MDL may be a way for city and 
county plaintiffs to access a more favorable version of the law or avoid it 
altogether. 
The doctrine has been used by courts to determine when government 
entities can recover damages from tortfeasors.  Under the doctrine, “[t]he 
general rule is that public expenditures made in the performance of 
governmental functions are not recoverable.”87  For example, courts have 
held that governments cannot recover damages for cleaning up negligently 
caused oil spills,88 incarceration of criminals,89 recapturing an escaped 
convict,90 providing health care and lost wages to a soldier injured by a 
private corporation,91 and industrial fire suppression.92  The doctrine has 
been adopted in several states, including Georgia,93 and it has been 
embraced by federal courts.94 
The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit’s 1992 
case In re Oil Spill by the AMOCO Cadiz coined the term “free public 
services doctrine.”95  But precedents as far back as 1903 historically 
rejected government claims for specific types of expenditures.96  Two 
1974 Wisconsin cases97 and one 1976 New Jersey case98 squarely 
recognized the modern doctrine, which has also been applied in federal 
court.  For example, in District of Columbia v. Air Florida, Inc., the 
                                                          
methods for distributing guns were negligent and a public nuisance). 
 85.   See infra notes 106–115. 
 86.   City of Philadelphia, 126 F. Supp. 2d at 894–95. 
 87.   Koch v. Consol. Edison Co., 468 N.E.2d 1, 7–8 (N.Y. 1984) (denying New York City’s 
ability to recover costs “incurred for wages, salaries, overtime and other benefits of police, fire, 
sanitation and hospital personnel from whom services . . . were required” in response to rioting that 
took place during a blackout caused by the power company’s gross negligence).  
 88.   In re Oil Spill by the Amoco Cadiz, 954 F.2d 1279, 1310 (7th Cir. 1992). 
 89.   Napa State Hosp. v. Yuba Cty., 71 P. 450, 452 (Cal. 1903). 
 90.   State Highway & Pub. Works Comm’n v. Cobb, 2 S.E.2d 565, 566–67 (N.C. 1939). 
 91.   United States v. Standard Oil of Cal., 332 U.S. 301, 316–17 (1947). 
 92.   City of Bridgeton v. B. P. Oil, Inc., 369 A.2d 49, 54–55 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1976). 
 93.   Walker Cty. v. Tri-State Crematory, 643 S.E.2d 324, 327 (Ga. Ct. App. 2007). 
 94.   E.g., Cty. of Erie v. Colgan Air, Inc., 711 F.3d 147, 154 (2d Cir. 2013) (holding that the 
county could not bring an action against airline to recover the costs of emergency and clean-up services 
it incurred when responding to airplane crash).  
 95.   954 F.2d 1279, 1310 (7th Cir. 1992). 
 96.   Napa State Hosp. v. Yuba Cty., 71 P. 450, 452 (Cal. 1903). 
 97.   Allenton Volunteer Fire Dep’t v. Soo Line R. Co., 372 F. Supp. 422, 423 (E.D. Wis. 1974); 
Town of Howard v. Soo Line RR Co., 217 N.W.2d 329, 330 (Wis. 1974).  
 98.   City of Bridgeton v. B. P. Oil, Inc., 369 A.2d 49, 54–55 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1976). 
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District of Columbia alleged negligence on the part of an airline and 
sought to recover the expenses that they incurred in rescuing survivors, 
recovering the bodies of the deceased, and raising the airplane and its 
contents from the river.99  The court held that “public funds expended in 
the ‘performance of governmental functions such as the emergency service 
provided by plaintiff following the crash . . . are not recoverable in 
tort.’”100 
Although the doctrine broadly denies government recovery for “public 
expenditures made in the performance of governmental functions[,]”101 it 
is not without limitations and exceptions.  First, the doctrine does not bar 
recovery of public service expenditures expressly authorized by statute.102  
Second, it allows recovery of public service costs where contracts provide 
for recovery.103  Third, federal courts have ruled that recovery is not barred 
where government public service expenditures are necessary to abate a 
nuisance.104  Finally, federal courts have found that governmental entities 
can recover from tortfeasors for damage to public lands, buildings, or 
equipment.105 
Despite those exceptions and limitations in federal common law, the 
doctrine remains quite strong in Georgia, and thus may be driving the near-
unanimity of Georgia city and county plaintiffs joining the Ohio MDL.  In 
the leading Georgia case of Walker County v. Tri-State Crematory, the 
county brought a negligence and public nuisance action against the 
crematorium, on whose property human remains were found, and the 
funeral homes that sent bodies to the crematorium, to recover the costs that 
                                                          
 99.   District of Columbia v. Air Fla., Inc., 750 F.2d 1077, 1078 (D.C. Cir. 1984).  
 100.   Id. at 1079 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 101.   Koch v. Consol. Edison Co., 468 N.E.2d 1, 8 (N.Y. 1984). 
 102.   See Cherry Hill Twp. v. Conti Constr. Co., 527 A.2d 921, 922–23 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 
1987) (denying the Township from bringing an action against construction company, which had 
accidentally ruptured natural gas main, to recover damages for expenses incurred in providing services 
to meet the emergency caused by the rupture), superseded by statute, N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2A:62A-21 
(West 2019), as recognized in In re Lead Paint Litig., 924 A.2d 484, 502 n.9 (N.J. 2007).  
 103.   S. California Edison Co. v. United States, 415 F.2d 758, 759 (9th Cir. 1969) (per curiam) 
(granting the government reimbursement for cleanup costs against a polluter based on a land-use 
permit conditioned on the payment of such costs).  
 104.   See, e.g., United States v. Ill. Terminal R. Co., 501 F. Supp. 18, 19 (E.D. Mo. 1980) (holding 
that “[r]ecent federal court decisions reflect[ed] a growing recognition of suits by government agencies 
under federal common law for the abatement of public nuisances.”); see also City of Evansville v. 
Kentucky Liquid Recycling, Inc., 604 F.2d 1008, 1017–21 (7th Cir. 1979) (holding that plaintiffs 
could recover their water-treatment costs from defendants under “federal common law” of interstate 
water pollution). 
 105.   See, e.g., Pennsylvania v. Gen. Pub. Utils. Corp., 710 F.2d 117, 122–23 (3d Cir. 1983) 
(holding that the government should have been able to present evidence that radioactive material 
released due to the defendants’ negligence-created property damage rendered city buildings unsafe 
and unusable, upon which the government could recover resulting economic losses).  
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the county had incurred in recovering, moving, storing, and identifying the 
remains.106  The defendants invoked the free public services doctrine to 
bar the county’s claims.107  The county countered that it still could seek 
recovery for negligence and public nuisance.108 
The court rejected the county’s argument, reasoning that because local 
governments were established by the legislature “to provide core services 
for the public and pay for these services by spreading the costs to all 
citizens through taxation,” the local government cannot reallocate how 
those costs are spread via tort claims through the judicial system.109  The 
court relied on an earlier case, Torres v. Putnam County, in which Putnam 
County sought injunctive relief against business operators who were 
unlawfully occupying buildings on their property without obtaining 
required inspections, certificates of occupancy, and the like.110  Putnam 
County also sought tort damages for the expense of sending the building 
inspector and sheriff to the property.111  The trial court’s dismissal was 
affirmed on the grounds that the county’s injury was experienced in 
“enforcing its laws and protecting its citizens” and was thus not 
compensable under tort law.112 
Although following and applying the Putnam County precedent, the 
Walker County court allowed two exceptions to the doctrine: First, the 
government could recover under specific statutory authorization; and 
second, the government could recover for damage to government-owned 
property.113  The first exception did not apply because Walker County had 
not shown a specific statute that would allow them to recover damages for 
abating a public nuisance.114  The second exception did not apply because 
Walker County was not seeking to recover damages associated with an 
injury to its property but rather to recover the costs of the public service of 
cleaning up the site.  Therefore, the court concluded that “whether or not 
the carrying out of a public service was mandatory or discretionary” the 
                                                          
 106.   Walker Cty. v. Tri-State Crematory, 643 S.E.2d 324, 325–26 (Ga. Ct. App. 2007). 
 107.   Id. at 326. 
 108.   Id. at 327. 
 109.   Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 110.   541 S.E.2d 133, 134 (Ga. Ct. App. 2000). 
 111.   Id. 
 112.   Id. at 136–37. 
 113.   Walker Cty. v. Tri-State Crematory, 643 S.E.2d 324, 327 (Ga. Ct. App. 2007). 
 114.   Id.  Walker County did cite to Ga. Code Ann. § 31-21-26 (West 2018), which states that 
“[n]either the state, county, municipality, nor officers thereof shall be placed at any expense by reason 
of delivery or distribution of bodies,” but the court held that this statute “refer[red] to the delivery or 
distribution of unclaimed bodies for purposes of medical research,” when read in context with its 
surrounding provisions.  Walker Cty, 643 S.E.2d at 328.  They further held that the two situations were 
too different to allow the County to recover under the statute.  Id. 
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free public services doctrine barred the county’s negligence and public 
nuisance claims.115 
Should the cases be remanded to state court or adjudicated under state 
law, the free public services doctrine could stand as a serious obstacle to 
local governments’ recovery.  That said, there is one possible line of 
argument, which at least one court found persuasive.116  On June 18, 2018, 
Suffolk County New York Judge Jerry Garguilo declared that the plaintiffs 
had presented more than enough evidence for their lawsuit to go forward 
and denied the defendants’ motions to dismiss, with the exception of one 
defendant for which personal jurisdiction was lacking.117  With respect to 
the municipal cost recovery rule argument, Judge Garguilo noted that the 
claims did not involve damages claims for “the normal provision of police, 
fire and emergency services,”118 but rather sought to “remedy public harm 
caused by an intentional, persistent course of deceptive conduct.”119  To 
accept the defendants’ argument that “the municipal cost recovery rule 
forecloses the plaintiffs from recovering the costs for services to treat 
residents suffering from prescription opioid abuse, addiction or overdose, 
or for the increased costs of programs implemented to stem prescription 
opioid-related criminal activities,” even when intentional, deceptive 
conduct that “mislead the public and prescribers about the risks of 
prescription opioids” is alleged, “would distort the doctrine beyond 
recognition.”120  City and county plaintiffs could rely on similar arguments 
to seek exception to the doctrine in other states. 
5. Advantages of MDL 
Although the MDL does not require the same degree of commonality 
and typicality as a full-blown federal class action, there may be advantages 
for individual local governmental units to proceed together.  For one, the 
MDL is designed to consolidate and streamline pretrial discovery, which 
has been a priority for Judge Polster.  He has coordinated plaintiffs’ access 
to the federal Drug Enforcement Administration’s (DEA) Automated 
Reports and Consolidated Ordering System (ARCOS) database121 of 
                                                          
 115.   Walker Cty, 643 S.E.2d at 329.   
 116.   In re Opioid Litig., No. 400000/2017, 2018 WL 3115102 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. June 18, 2018). 
 117.   Id. at *28. 
 118.   Id. at *11–12 (quoting City of Flagstaff v. Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Ry. Co., 719 F.2d 
322, 324 (9th Cir. 1983)). 
 119.   Id. at *12. 
 120.   Id. 
 121.   Automation of Reports and Consolidated Orders System (ARCOS), U.S. DEP’T OF JUST. 
DRUG ENFORCEMENT ADMIN., https://www.deadiversion.usdoj.gov/arcos/index.html [https://perma. 
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controlled substances transactional records relevant to their local 
markets,122 and issued other uniform discovery orders.123  ARCOS 
provides, for both sides, the extent of involvement by any particular 
distributors.  Another order particularly relevant to the local government 
costs question is the June 19, 2018 Fact Sheet Implementation Order, 
which calls for detailed responses from all government plaintiffs, 
including cities and counties, regarding their claimed injuries, damages, 
and persons with relevant knowledge.124  This discovery order originally 
had a ninety-day deadline ending on September 18, 2018,125 which was 
extended for an additional ninety days.126  The questions in the 
Government Plaintiff Fact Sheet overlap with but do not precisely track 
the personnel interviewed and types of information sought in our study. 
Another advantage of the MDL posture is the potential to drive 
settlement pretrial.  Quite overtly, that has been a goal of Judge Polster’s 
in managing the MDL.127  On January 9, 2018, at the very first meeting of 
counsel in the MDL, he remarked: 
 
People aren’t interested in figuring out the answer to interesting legal 
questions like preemption and learned intermediary, or unravelling 
complicated conspiracy theories. 
So my objective is to do something meaningful to abate this crisis and to 
do it in 2018. . . . 
. . . . 
. . . [W]e don’t need a lot of briefs and we don’t need trials.  They’re not 
going to—none of them are—none of those are going to solve what 
we’ve got.128 
 
Judge Polster further expressed a commitment to accomplishing what 
                                                          
cc/3GT6-GGCF] (last visited Apr. 1, 2019) (“ARCOS is an automated, comprehensive drug reporting 
system which monitors the flow of DEA controlled substances from their point of manufacture through 
commercial distribution channels to point of sale or distribution at the dispensing/retail level . . . .”). 
 122.   See, e.g., Order Regarding ARCOS Data, In re Nat’l Prescription Opiate Litig., No. 17-2804 
(N.D. Ohio Apr. 11, 2018), ECF No. 233 (first of three ARCOS orders).  
 123.   See, e.g., Order Regarding Designating Attorneys Addressing Coordination of State/Federal 
Discovery, In re Nat’l Prescription Opiate Litig., No. 17-2804 (N.D. Ohio June 13, 2018), ECF No. 
616. 
 124.   Fact Sheet Implementation Order, In re Nat’l Prescription Opiate Litig., No. 17-2804 (N.D. 
Ohio June 19, 2018), ECF No. 638. 
 125.   Id. at 1. 
 126.   Report of Special Master entering Discovery Order for Track One Cases & Amending Prior 
Orders at 6–7, In re Nat’l Prescription Opiate Litig., No. 17-2804 (N.D. Ohio Sept. 6, 2018), ECF No. 
941. 
 127.   Transcript of Proceedings at 4–5, In re Nat’l Prescription Opiate Litig., No. 17-2804 (N.D. 
Ohio Jan. 9, 2018), ECF No. 58 [hereinafter Jan. 9 Proceeding]. 
 128.   Id. at 4, 9. 
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state and federal elected officials thus far had failed to do in addressing the 
opioid crisis,129 drawing criticism for judicial activism and 
overstepping.130  He stated on record at the same January meeting of 
counsel: “The federal court is probably the least likely branch of 
government to try and tackle [the opioid epidemic], but candidly, the other 
branches of government, federal and state, have punted.”131  Given that 
stance, the question of settlement and, accordingly, damages becomes all 
the more important to nail down. 
B. Tribal Lawsuits 
As discussed more fully in Vice Chancellor Stacy Leeds’s article in 
this issue, Native American tribes have been out ahead of states in both 
addressing and litigating the opioid epidemic.  Those cases are particularly 
instructive for this cost study because tribal nation’s health care and other 
services are provided within discrete jurisdictional boundaries.132  
Moreover, tribes have been especially proactive in treatment and 
prevention around opioid addiction.  The opioid crisis has had an 
especially severe impact in tribal nations.  At a hearing before the 
Committee on Indian Affairs, chief medical officer of the Indian Health 
Service (IHS) reported that American Indians and Alaska Natives had the 
highest drug overdose death rates in 2015.  Also, between 1999 and 2005, 
Native Americans’ deaths by overdose increased by “more than 500 
percent.”133  Native Americans comprise “only 2 percent of the total U.S. 
population” yet they “experience[] the highest rate of opioid-related 
fatalities . . . .”134  The root of the problem could be traced in part to the 
                                                          
 129.   Hoffman, supra note 10. 
 130.   See Ryan J. Duplechin, What is the Role of the Judiciary in Tackling the Opioid Epidemic?, 
PETRIE-FLOM CTR. (June 15, 2018) http://blog.petrieflom.law.harvard.edu/2018/06/15/what-is-the-
role-of-the-judiciary-in-tackling-the-opioid-epidemic/ [https://perma.cc/5VGY-SL83]; Daniel Fisher, 
Judge Sees Litigation as Only an ‘Aid in Settlement Discussions’ for Opioid Lawsuits, FORBES (May 
10, 2018 11:54 AM) https://www.forbes.com/sites/legalnewsline/2018/05/10/judge-sees-litigation-as-
only-an-aid-in-settlement-discussions-for-opioid-lawsuits/#6fe6d18c4b99 [https://perma.cc/7G7C-
4LLB]; see also Elizabeth Chamblee Burch & Margaret S. Williams, Repeat Players in Multidistrict 
Litigation: The Social Network, 102 CORNELL L. REV. 1445, 1446 (2017) (critiquing repeat MDL 
attorneys’ ability to influence the MDL rules because “the rules they develop may principally benefit 
them at the expense of one-shot plaintiffs”). 
 131.   Jan. 9 Proceeding, supra note 127, at 4. 
 132.   See generally Stacy L. Leeds, Beyond an Emergency Declaration: Tribal Governments and 
the Opioid Crisis, 67 U. KAN. L. REV. 1013 (2019) (discussing the Native American tribes’ opioid 
litigation). 
 133.   Opioids in Indian Country: Beyond the Crisis to Healing the Community: Hearing Before 
the S. Comm. on Indian Affairs, 115th Cong. 3 (Mar. 14, 2018) (statement of Michael E. Toedt, MD, 
Chief Medical Officer of the Indian Health Services) [hereinafter Hearing]. 
 134.   Suzette Brewer, Tribes Lead the Battle to Combat a National Opioid Crisis, HIGH COUNTRY 
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“over-prescription of painkillers at [IHS] hospitals and clinics across the 
country.”135 
In addition to the death toll, the crisis also exacts heavy economic 
consequences on these already impoverished communities.  For instance, 
many funds intended for basic human services, such as housing or elder 
programs, are “being redirected to pay for additional law enforcement, 
social services . . . and . . . treatment facilities and programs . . . .”136  The 
tribes also struggle with retaining physicians in remote rural area, which 
contributes to this crisis.137  Moreover, according to the chairman of the 
Chippewa Indians of Michigan, the tribes receive “direct services” from 
the IHS and “have little choice but to accept policies and procedures 
[believed to be] under the direct influence of the pharmaceutical 
industry.”138 
Accordingly, the tribal governments sued opioid manufacturers, 
distributors, and retailers.  In April 2017, the Cherokee Nation filed suit in 
tribal court against various defendants such as Wal-Mart, CVS, Cardinal 
Health, McKesson, and AmerisourceBergen.139  The complaint alleged 
that the defendants, by “turning a blind eye to known or knowable 
problems in their own supply chains,” created “opioid diversion”140 in the 
black market, which “caused and continue to cause a crisis that threatens 
the health, safety, and welfare of the citizens of the Cherokee Nation.”141  
The tribe sought damages in the form of costs for (1) medical care for 
opioid-related patients, (2) counseling and rehabilitation, (3) treatment of 
infants born with conditions caused by opioids, (4) welfare for children 
whose parents are victims of the crisis, (5) law enforcement and public 
safety, and (6) lost productivity.142  U.S. District Court Judge Terence 
Kern enjoined the suit, holding that the Cherokee Nation Tribal Court 
lacked jurisdiction over non-native corporations and that the harm alleged 
was not sufficiently “catastrophic for tribal self-government” to warrant 
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 135.   Id.  
 136.   Id. 
 137.   Id. 
 138.   Id.  
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tribal jurisdiction.143  The tribe then filed the case in Sequoyah County 
State Court in Oklahoma.144 
The jurisdictional conflict is between tribes’ sovereign authority, on 
the one hand, and federal district courts’ original jurisdiction over actions 
arising under federal law, on the other.145  Very early U.S. Supreme Court 
precedents specify that Native American tribes are “distinct, independent 
political communities, retaining their original natural rights” in matters of 
local self- government.146  While no longer “possessed of the full attributes 
of sovereignty,” tribes remain a “separate people, with the power of 
regulating their internal and social relations . . . .”147  Thus, tribal 
jurisdiction turns on whether the defendant is Native American and 
whether the events occurred within the geographic boundaries of the tribal 
community.148  More recently, in 1985, the U.S. Supreme Court affirmed 
that tribal remedies, including tribal courts’ adjudication of jurisdictional 
matters,149 must be exhausted before federal district courts may hear 
them.150 
As noted, tribal jurisdiction is limited.  For one, tribes generally lack 
jurisdiction over non-tribal members.151  An exception exists, however, if 
the defendant entered a consensual commercial relationship with the 
tribe.152  Consensual commercial relationships include private contracts 
according to the U.S. Supreme Court.153  The opioid defendants argued, 
however, that selling or distributing products via commercial pharmacies 
and insurers does not establish that sort of agreement with the tribe, thus, 
                                                          
 143.   McKesson Corp. v. Hembree, No. 17-CV-323, 2018 WL 340042, at *8 (N.D. Okla. Jan. 9, 
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the arrangement does not invoke the exception.154  Even medications 
provided to patients via IHS facilities do not constitute such an agreement 
because IHS ultimately is funded by the federal government.155 
Given the jurisdictional scuffle in the Cherokee Nation case, other 
tribes that initiated opioid litigation mostly have filed in federal courts.  
The St. Croix Chippewa Indians filed in federal court in Wisconsin, and 
the Flandreau Santee Sioux and the Rosebud Sioux tribes filed in federal 
court in South Dakota.  Both suits alleged that defendants “flooded their 
territories with opioids and failed to prevent the diversion of these drugs,” 
along with violation of state consumer protection law.156  Another tribe, 
the Coyote Valley Band of Pomo Indians, brought a tort claim in 
California state court.157  Tension remains among tribal advocates 
regarding the merits of the federal MDL versus state courts.  Again, 
perhaps recognizing the momentum of the MDL, in October 2018, three 
days before Columbus/Indigenous Peoples Day, four hundred forty-eight 
tribes filed an historic amicus brief in the federal MDL, asserting the 
especially devastating impact of the opioid epidemic on tribes and 
particular sovereign interests implicated.158  On similar grounds, the 
litigant tribes successfully sought a separate track in the MDL,159 along 
with Alabama, the original state in the MDL.160 
The tribes’ experience and litigation process may be instructive to this 
cost study because, first, the impact of the epidemic has been especially 
dramatic on their communities; second, the tribes have been out in front 
of the crisis in various regards; and, third, the costs may be easier to 
identify within a discrete sovereign nation.  On the first point, in addition 
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to the death toll recounted above, the crisis also exacts heavy economic 
consequences on already impoverished Native American communities.  
As noted, many funds intended for basic human services, such as housing 
or programs for the elderly have been redirected to address the opioid 
epidemic.161  In addition, there is a suggestion that the structure of IHS 
funding and administration may make medical services with tribal lands 
especially susceptible to pharmaceutical industry control.162 Various 
factors may support that potential, including the Joint Commission’s pain 
scale and pharmaceutical marketing for increased prescribing, as opposed 
to other pain management strategies.  The provider shortages may lead to 
prescriptions being written for longer durations of time between refills, 
and the direct payment design of IHS may reduce oversight. 
Structurally, IHS is a division of the U.S. Department of Health and 
Human Services (HHS) and is responsible for providing “federal health 
services to American Indians and Alaska Natives.”163  IHS is the only 
division of HHS whose “primary function is direct delivery of health 
care.”164  By contrast, for example, Medicare and Medicaid operate as 
federal health insurance programs, paying for, but not directly providing, 
medical care or services.  Treaties between the United States and tribes 
obligate the federal government to appropriate funds to IHS annually.165  
The actual health care services may be provided by IHS, tribal entities, or 
Urban Indian Health Program, using the federal funds.  Those facilities 
generally do not charge or bill any patients regardless of their insurance 
status.166  As an alternative, tribes may enter into Tribal Self-Governance 
Programs if they can show under Public Law 93-638 the economic and 
personnel resources sufficient to provide health care for their 
communities.167  In any case, direct provision of health care, without the 
overlay of managed care strategies that public and private insurers have 
utilized to hold down costs,168 as well as Medicare value-based purchasing 
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and conditions of participation designed to improve quality of care, may 
not operate as robustly within IHS.169 
Although the structure and administration of IHS may exacerbate the 
opioid crisis, tribal nations also have taken the lead in various other 
respects to address the opioid epidemic.  Tribes have been on the forefront 
of employing medication-assisted treatment (MAT) and culturally 
cognizant counseling services.170  In addition, Public Law 93-638 
qualified tribes, which “receive an annual lump-sum . . . funding that 
would otherwise be used by IHS to provide direct care services,” have 
supplemented that fund with revenues from tribal economic ventures to 
“renovate[] or construct[] their own hospitals and outpatient clinics” and 
“redesign health programs according to the needs of the community,”171 
creating another avenue for innovative treatment.  Tribes also were 
proactive in tracking prescription drugs.  In July 2016, a few months after 
Congress passed a law172 that made it “virtually impossible for the DEA 
to freeze suspicious narcotic shipments from [pharmaceutical] 
companies,”173 IHS implemented the Prescription Drug Monitoring 
Programs (PDMP), aiming to “strengthen[] . . . monitoring and deterrence 
of prescription misuse and diversion.”174  IHS was “the first federal 
medical agency to require providers to check state [PDMP] databases prior 
to prescribing and dispensing opioids for treatment longer than seven 
days.”175  IHS also requires pharmacies to report opioid prescribing data 
to state PDMPs, although not expressly required by state or federal laws.176  
In March 2017, IHS chartered the National Committee on Heroin Opioids 
and Pain Efforts (HOPE) to effectively coordinate patient care and conduct 
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research in cases of substance abuse.177 
The tribal nations are in a unique position to accurately estimate 
damages from the lawsuits.  As discussed above, the healthcare system is 
effectively centralized within IHS—either IHS directly delivers healthcare 
services, or tribes get funding through Public Law contracts.  As part of 
the process of annual funding, IHS is required to submit to the federal 
government a detailed budget request following specific formulation 
guidelines.178  Moreover, the Government Performance and Results Act 
(GPRA) requires all federal agencies, IHS included, to demonstrate that 
“they are using their funds effectively toward meeting their missions”; 
accordingly, IHS carefully tracks its activities and performance measures 
for annual reporting.179  For instance, in March 2018, IHS received a ten 
percent increase in funding and allocated five million dollars to the Opioid 
Response Grant Fund and Medication-Assisted Treatment Program.180  
Due to these requirements and the structure of the health care delivery 
system in tribal nations, the IHS is uniquely postured to track, identify, 
and categorize the costs related to opioid treatment in ways that local 
governments are not. 
Given the high rates of opioid abuse disorder and related issues in 
Native American tribes, the impact on children, including newborns, 
within those communities has also been significant.  Newborns exposed to 
opioids during the mother’s pregnancy often experience Neonatal 
Abstinence Syndrome (NAS).  The Substance Abuse and Mental Health 
Services Administration (SAMHSA), a division of HHS, oversees 
surveillance, data collection, and policy recommendations around the 
issue of prenatal substance exposure.181  This data includes a population-
level survey on substance use and mental health, substance use disorder 
treatment, and facility-level data on substance use disorder treatment, with 
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particular attention to Native American tribes in various points.182  For 
opioid-exposed babies, IHS incurs additional costs for hospitalization and 
medication during the withdrawal, as well as transportation and care of the 
infants.183  In addition, Native American children affected by opioids may 
face particular challenges with respect to child welfare services.  The 
foster care system may become involved when the children cannot live at 
home due to addicted parents or the birth parents choose not to parent.  
NAS newborns “are given morphine treatments to ensure they . . . don’t 
encounter the dangerous side effects of withdrawing too quickly” and are 
weaned off after a few weeks, but “they can be fussy, hard to console and 
take care of” in the process, which deters potential foster families.184  
Placement of these children also is complicated under the Indian Child 
Welfare Act.  A provision of the Act places preference for other family 
members, then a family within the tribe or any other Native American 
Indian before the child may be adopted by other families.185  On October 
12, 2018, U.S. District Judge Reed O’Connor held that provision 
unconstitutional for violating equal protection.186  Expanding the pool of 
potential foster or adoptive families may assist in the care of babies born 
exposed to opioids, but may have other serious costs, including an 
existential threat to tribal nations, since most of them are small 
communities and fear permanent placement of their future generations 
outside the tribe. 
Given the sovereign status of tribes, the unique impacts of the opioid 
crisis in those communities, health and welfare delivery structures, and 
tribes’ proactive approach to addressing the opioid epidemic, they provide 
a unique case study, although full discussion is beyond the scope of this 
Article.  One relevant takeaway point, however, is that it may be much 
easier to isolate tribal opioid costs, as compared to city and county 
government opioid costs.  Health care costs are well documented through 
annual reports to Congress, and tribal versus federal funding can be readily 
identified.  Other opioid-related expenditures, including under-contract 
purchases from non-IHS providers and pharmacies, and budget 
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reallocations are also apparent.  Various policy innovations, including 
MAT and PDMP, offer best practices that non-tribal governmental units 
may consider in addressing the opioid epidemic. 
C. Progress at the MDL 
As of this writing, the local government and other cases are still 
pending at the MDL.  Progress has been made over the past year since the 
MDL was constituted, but settlement discussion and damages assessments 
remain illusory.  Early in the process, last winter, on January 11, 2018, 
Judge Polster issued an order appointing three special masters to assist 
with the litigation: David R. Cohen, Francis McGovern, and Cathy 
Yanni.187  David Cohen is a federal special master who has had years of 
experience in mediation, arbitration, and court monitoring.188  Mr. Cohen 
was appointed special master in nearly twenty multidistrict litigation and 
other class actions, including mass tort, national health crisis, and Fair 
Labor Standards Act (FLSA) class actions.189  Francis McGovern is a 
professor at Duke University School of Law.190  Professor McGovern has 
served as a court-appointed special master in over seventy complex cases 
and has “developed solutions in most of the significant mass claim 
litigation in the U.S.” and abroad, including the United Nations 
Compensation Commission, DDT toxic exposure litigation in Alabama, 
and silicone gel breast implant litigation.191  Cathy Yanni is a panelist with 
JAMS, “the largest private provider of [mediation and arbitration] services 
worldwide,” and has served as settlement special master in over twenty 
large pharmaceutical and medical device cases, in addition to multiple 
class actions and MDL cases in the past.192 
On January 31, 2018, Judge Polster held a closed-door session with 
tiers of lead lawyers, and their experts and clients.  According to three 
people in attendance of the meeting, the experts and Attorneys General 
recommended that Purdue’s eighty-milligram version of OxyContin, 
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which is often crushed and snorted by abusers, be removed from the 
market.193  Setting aside the fact that an MDL judge lacks formal 
regulatory authority, or even clear authority over the merits of the 
litigation, ten days later, on February 9, 2018, Purdue announced that it 
would no longer market OxyContin to prescribers.194  An expert in the 
addiction field, Dr. Anna Lembke from Stanford University, attributed this 
“radical reversal” by Purdue, which has long contended that it had not 
influenced physicians with its drug representations, to “overwhelming 
pressure from Judge Polster.”195  Another plausible explanation is the 
“pressure to rehabilitate [the] company[’s] reputation damaged by 
litigation and other publicity” by taking an affirmative step to contribute 
to the solution.196 
On February 2, 2018, Judge Polster issued an Order directing the 
plaintiffs and the DEA to discuss the scope of ARCOS database 
production.197  ARCOS requires manufacturers and distributors to report 
their controlled substances transactional records to the DEA.198  The 
information is “collected and compiled by DEA . . . for determining quota, 
distribution trends, internal audits, and other analyses.”199  Every time one 
of the controlled substance pills is sold, it is reported to the database, 
regarding “where the pill[] went, where [it was] sold and sort of the market 
share situation.”200  Access to the database would provide the plaintiffs 
with knowledge of “the extent of involvement by any particular distributor 
and where maybe [they] need to focus more . . . efforts.”201  The DEA 
represented that it could provide information regarding large 
manufacturers, by state, for a two-year period from 2012 to 2013.202  In a 
hearing on February 26, 2018, the court directed the attorney for 
                                                          
 193.   Jef Feeley, Purdue’s Oxycontin Targeted at Judge’s Opioid Summit, BLOOMBERG (Feb. 2, 
2018, 3:00 AM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2018-02-02/purdue-s-oxycontin-said-to-
be-targeted-at-judge-s-opioid-summit. 
 194.   Purdue Pharma L.P. Issues Statement on Opioid Promotion, PURDUE PHARMA L.P. (Feb. 
9, 2018), http://www.purduepharma.com/news-media/2018/02/purdue-pharma-l-p-issues-statement-
on-opioid-promotion/ [https://perma.cc/T8K6-G5UX].  
 195.   Hoffman, supra note 10. 
 196.   See Gluck et al., supra note 11, at 360. 
 197.   Minutes of 2/26/18 Hearing and Order at 1, In re Nat’l Prescription Opiate Litig., No. 17-
2804 (N.D. Ohio Mar. 1, 2018), ECF No. 155 [hereinafter Feb. 26 Hearing]. 
 198.   ARCOS Retail Drug Summary Reports, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE DRUG ENFORCEMENT 
ADMIN., https://www.deadiversion.usdoj.gov/arcos/retail_drug_summary/index.html 
[https://perma.cc/KJ9R-2D75] (last visited Apr. 13, 2019); see 21 U.S.C. § 827(d)(1) (2012 & Supp. 
2016). 
 199.   ARCOS Retail Drug Summary Reports, supra note 198. 
 200.   Jan. 9 Proceeding, supra note 127, at 16. 
 201.   Id. 
 202.   Feb. 26 Hearing, supra note 197, at 2. 
2019 FINANCIAL IMPACT OF THE OPIOID CRISIS 1089 
DEA/DOJ to file a document by March 5, 2018, setting forth the 
authorization and length of time to produce information regarding 
manufacturers and distributors by states for a nine-year period from 2006 
through 2014.203 
Following two months of settlement talks, Judge Polster allowed 
lawyers to proceed with some discovery and motion filings.204  “On March 
6, 2018, the Court met with the parties’ negotiating teams, liaison counsel 
and representatives of numerous State Attorneys General to discuss the 
status of settlement negotiations.”205  The parties reported both substantial 
progress and “various barriers to a global resolution.”206  Judge Polster 
directed the parties to submit to the special masters, by March 16, 2018, 
“their suggestions regarding the appropriate scope and timing of a 
litigation track and the contents of a case management order (‘CMO’), 
including identification of test cases, sequencing of discovery, timing of 
motion practice (including issues related to remand), and any other 
relevant matters.”207  In the same order, the judge also directed special 
masters to continue settlement talks with the MDL attorneys, and 
scheduled a May 10, 2018 settlement conference.208 
On April 11, 2018, the court entered an ARCOS Data Order, directing 
the DEA to produce information regarding manufacturers and distributors 
for six states for the period of nine years from January 1, 2006, to 
December 31, 2014.209  The six states were Ohio, West Virginia, Illinois, 
Alabama, Michigan, and Florida.210  Commenting on the usefulness of the 
data, such as allowing plaintiffs to identity previously unknown companies 
to add to the complaints, the court issued the Second ARCOS Order on 
May 7, 2018, expanding the scope to the entire United States for the same 
period.211  On June 26, 2018, the Court issued the Third ARCOS Order, 
directing the DEA to supplement missing information on certain relevant 
chemicals.212 
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 206.   Id. 
 207.   Id. 
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On June 19, 2018, the court issued another discovery order213 
requiring both parties to provide a completed Fact Sheet within ninety 
days.214  This Government Plaintiff Fact Sheet is particularly pertinent to 
our study, in that it asks the plaintiffs to provide documentation supporting 
their damages allegations, which include several categories: (1) increased 
costs for first responders, including EMT and ambulance charges, cost of 
payment for improper prescriptions, public hospital charges, 
Narcan/Naxolone administration and training costs, opioid treatment and 
prevention programs; (2) law enforcement and incarceration costs, which 
includes Drug Task Force, operating cost for Drug Accountability courts, 
and costs associated with inmates, transportation, and healthcare treatment 
in prison; (3) mortality costs, which range from costs in indigent burial, 
transportation, and morgue space, to costs in assisting with the foster 
children whose family members were victims of the opioid crisis; (4) 
rehabilitation costs, covering drug abuse treatment, counseling, and 
education programs.215  That discovery request called for extensive, 
detailed disclosures related to the plaintiffs’ claimed damages, dating back 
ten years, to January 1, 2008.216 
Judge Polster has also ordered a series of “‘bellwether trials,’ or test 
cases that give attorneys an idea of how future cases may play out,” to 
begin in 2019.217  The nature of the litigation, along with the scope of 
discovery and expanding list of defendants, “has made it particularly 
challenging to contain within traditional legal procedures.”218  The first 
trial was set for March 2019, later delayed six months to November 2019, 
and “will include claims made by the city of Cleveland and Cuyahoga and 
Summit counties in Northeast Ohio.”219  Setting trial dates at all, plus the 
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delay, is notable given Judge Polster’s initial insistence on speedy and 
non-merits-based resolution of the cases.  Such was the status of the MDL 
at the time we initiated our interviews with local government department 
heads and assessment of their ability to quantify these and other opioid-
related costs.  Before describing our study, however, we next survey other 
studies estimating the financial impact of the opioid crisis, which, for 
reasons we explain below, are very difficult to translate into usable cost 
estimates at the city or county level. 
III. EXISTING OPIOID COST STUDIES 
Calculating an accurate number to reflect the financial cost on local 
governments caused by the opioid crisis requires creative and careful 
thought about the various potential cost impacts as well as appreciation for 
the fact that, at least in some locations, some of the more obvious costs 
will not be borne by local governments.  As noted above, government 
healthcare programs are funded at the federal and state, and not local, 
level.  In Georgia, local public health departments and child welfare 
agencies also are state-funded, although that arrangement will differ in 
other jurisdictions.  School districts are separate governmental units with 
their own funding streams and budgets.  For these and other reasons 
discussed more fully below, existing studies of the economic impact of 
opioids are of limited value in assessing local governments’ costs.  These 
recent studies provide a helpful picture of the burden of the opioid crisis 
on a “macro,” or national, level, but translating those findings into 
meaningful, calculable amounts for any particular local government is 
much more challenging. 
A. Literature Review 
This Section describes existing studies of opioid-related costs, namely 
health care, law enforcement, and lost productivity, as well some state-
specific research assessing the scope of the opioid problem and its 
incidence within certain industries, but not the particular costs borne by 
local governments.  We begin with two widely cited nationwide studies, 
then turn to two state-level studies for comparison, and, finally, describe 
some data collected on Georgia specifically. 
1. Florence et al., The Economic Burden of Prescription Opioid 
Overdose Abuse, and Dependence in the United States 
One of the most widely cited opioid cost studies is Curtis S. Florence 
1092 KANSAS LAW REVIEW Vol. 67 
et al.’s 2016 study The Economic Burden of Prescription Opioid Overdose 
Abuse, and Dependence in the United States, 2013.220  The Florence study 
considered costs recorded in 2013 in three main areas: the healthcare 
system, criminal justice, and the workforce.221  The study considered costs 
incurred due to overdose and abuse/dependence by examining health care 
and treatment cost, criminal justice cost, and lost productivity.222 
The total economic burden of the opioid crisis was “estimated to be 
$78.5 billion.”223  Over one-third of the total were excess health care costs 
caused by the opioid crisis, amounting to $28.9 billion.224  Increased 
criminal justice costs due to the opioid crises were about $7.7 billion.225  
The estimated cost of reduced productivity in the workforce was $20.4 
billion.226  Of those costs, the study found that seventy-three percent of the 
cost of the opioid crisis was found in the nonfatal consequences while 
twenty-seven percent was attributed to fatalities.227  Moreover, 
“[a]pproximately one quarter of the cost is borne by the public sector in 
health care, substance abuse treatment, and criminal justice costs.”228  
While those findings are significant regarding the scope of the problem 
and overall public cost impact, they say little about the costs borne by any 
single state’s city or county. 
Regarding methodology, Florence et al.’s data on the incidence of 
overdoses in 2013 came from the U.S. Centers for Disease Control and 
Prevention (CDC) WONDER database, which reports all deaths in the 
U.S. National Vital Statistics System, identified by the ICD-10 codes 
(T40.2–T40.4), coded as unintentional, intentional, and undetermined.229  
The measure of prescription opioid abuse and dependence came from the 
2013 National Survey on Drug Use and Health (NSDUH), capturing the 
U.S. civilian noninstitutionalized population ages twelve and older.230  
NSDUH collects information on substance use and identifies “abuse and 
dependence based on the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental 
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Disorders, 4th edition (DSM–IV).”231  The NSDUH “also collects detailed 
data on health insurance coverage . . . and . . . demographic information” 
(e.g., sex and age).232  The authors used NSDUH data to assign “health 
care costs and lost productivity costs to abuse/dependence cases”.233 
The study also used a “matched case-control design . . . to estimate the 
impact of prescription opioid abuse diagnoses on health care spending,” 
using the “Truven Health MarketScan Research Databases for 
commercial, Medicaid, and Medicare health plan enrollees.”234  The 
Truven Databases contain the pooled healthcare experience of enrollees in 
each type of health plan.235  For commercial and Medicare analyses, the 
study used a logistic regression model that “included age, sex 
(male/female), baseline health care costs, Charlson comorbidity index, 
region of patient residence, . . . and plan type . . . as independent 
variables.”236  The Medicaid analysis utilized “a logistic regression model” 
that included “age, sex, race, baseline health care costs, Charlson 
comorbidity index, Medicare eligibility, basis of eligibility, and plan 
type.”237  The total cost included “inpatient and outpatient care and all 
prescription drugs.”238  Excess costs “were then multiplied by the relevant 
number of opioid abuse patients derived from the NSDUH for each 
insurance coverage category reported in the survey data.”239 
The study acknowledged that there are other sources of payment for 
substance abuse treatment besides health plans; for example, the U.S. 
Department of Health and Human Services Substance Abuse and Mental 
Health Services Administration (SAMSHA) “block grants and private 
foundation funding.”240  Florence et al. accounted for those additional 
sources of payment by “identifying non-insurance-based federal, state, 
local, and private expenditures” for substance abuse treatment and then 
multiplying those costs “by the share of drug abuse and dependence cases 
associated with prescription opioids in the 2013 NSDUH.”241 
With respect to criminal justice costs, the study considered four 
components: “(1) police protection, (2) legal and adjudication, (3) 
                                                          
 231.   Id. 
 232.   Id.  
 233.   Id. 
 234.   Id. 
 235.   Id. 
 236.   Id. 
 237.   Id. at 902–03 (specific factors omitted). 
 238.   Id. at 903. 
 239.   Id. 
 240.   Id. 
 241.   Id. 
1094 KANSAS LAW REVIEW Vol. 67 
correctional facilities, and (4) property lost due to crimes.”242  Spending 
data on the first three components were obtained from the Justice 
Expenditure and Employment Extracts, 2012—Preliminary243 and “data 
on property lost due to crimes” was obtained from the Federal Bureau of 
Investigation’s Crime in the United States, 2012.244  The study then 
calculated the ratio of these costs that were attributable to opioids in 2013 
by looking to “the ratio of arrests for the components of police protection 
and legal and adjudication” costs, “the ratio of incarcerations for the 
correctional facilities component”, and the “ratio for the component of 
property lost due to crimes”.245 
The study considered three components of lost productivity costs: “(1) 
premature death from prescription opioid abuse or dependence, (2) 
reduced productive hours for abuse/dependence, and (3) incarceration.”246  
The cost of fatal opioid abuse or dependence was assessed by “entering 
the number of prescription opioid overdose deaths in 2013 into the Cost of 
Injury Reports application under CDC’s WISQARS (Web-based Injury 
Statistics Query and Reporting System) cost module.”247  The module 
“estimates the lost productivity of a fatal injury based on the sex and age 
of the decedent and the mechanism of injury.”248 The study then 
determined the costs based on “expected earnings for a person of the 
decedent’s sex and age over the remaining expected lifespan.”249  For 
calculating lost productivity, the study estimated the average time spent in 
employment and household production and “estimated the value 
(including fringe benefits) of this time by age and sex category.”250  That 
value was then “multiplied by the percentage reduction in productivity 
attributable to drug abuse/dependence (17% for males and 18% for 
females), and finally summed over values across all sex and age 
groups.”251  The prevalence of abuse/dependence cases “for each sex and 
age group [was] tabulated from the 2013 NSDUH” and then multiplied 
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“by the corresponding per person annual production value of US 
population” (inflated to 2013 dollars).252  For calculating lost productivity 
due to incarceration, the study took “the number of inmates incarcerated 
for crimes attributed to prescription opioid abuse or dependence at federal, 
state, and local levels” and multiplied by the per person “annual 
production value of the US population inflated to 2013 dollars.”253 
2. U.S. Council of Economic Advisor’s Report, The Underestimated 
Cost of the Opioid Crisis 
Another important study on opioid costs is the U.S. Council of 
Economic Advisor’s (CEA) 2017 report, The Underestimated Cost of the 
Opioid Crisis.254  The CEA reached a much higher estimate of $504 
billion, which is six times higher than Florence et al.’s estimate, even when 
adjusted to 2015 dollars.255  The CEA expanded Florence et al.’s study and 
made efforts to take into account the following additional factors: (1) the 
worsening of the crisis since Florence et al.’s study; (2) the increasing role 
of heroin abuse in the crisis; (3) evidence suggesting that fatality statistics 
understate the number of opioid-related deaths; and (4) the value of lives 
lost beyond earnings losses.256  One particularly notable difference, the 
CEA’s study included fatal and nonfatal measurements of heroin use, 
along with prescription opioid use, in evaluating the cost of the opioid 
crisis.257 
With respect to fatalities, the CEA 
diverge[d] from the previous literature by quantifying the costs of 
opioid-related overdose deaths based on . . . the ‘value of a statistical 
life’ (VSL).  Federal agencies routinely rely on VSL measures in health 
and safety settings when estimating the expected fatality risk-reduction 
benefits of a proposed regulation, policy, or program . . . Such valuations 
are typically based on how individuals trade off wealth for reduced 
mortality risks.258 
The CEA calculated the estimated VSL under four alternate 
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assumptions, ultimately preferring an age-dependent assumption drawn 
from a 2003 study by Aldy and Viscusi.259  The age-dependent calculation 
assumes that individuals between twenty-five and forty-four years old 
“place the greatest value on fatality risk reduction,” while those between 
ages eighteen and twenty-four, and forty-four and sixty-two, place lower 
values on risk reduction.260  Using that assumption, the CEA estimated 
total fatality costs of $431.7 billion.261 
To get there, CEA took the number of “officially reported opioid-
involved overdose deaths in the United States” in 2015 from the CDC 
WONDER Database—approximately 33,000—and created a distribution 
of the deaths by age.262  Because recent research suggested that opioid-
related overdoses are underreported on death certificates,263 the CEA 
accordingly adjusted the number of deaths in 2015, increasing the estimate 
to approximately 41,000.264  Using various possible alternate assumptions 
of VSL, the CEA estimated that the fatality cost of opioid overdoses 
ranged “from a low of $211.6 billion to a high of $549.8 billion.”265  The 
preferred age-dependent VSL assumption yielded an estimate cost of 
$431.7 billion for opioid fatalities.266  This is because the epidemic’s 
fatalities are concentrated in the age groups that have high valuations for 
risk reduction.267 
With respect to nonfatal opioid misuse, the CEA calculated the costs 
in two steps: (1) First, CEA used Florence et al.’s “estimates to obtain a 
per-person measure of costs” of those who did not die within the year; (2) 
second, that per-person cost was multiplied by “the number of individuals 
with an opioid use disorder in 2015. . . .”268  Accounting for inflation since 
2013, the CEA estimated that the average individual with an opioid 
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disorder cost his/her community $30,000.269  That estimate of the average 
cost then was applied to the 2.4 million individuals with opioid disorders 
in 2015, estimating the total cost of nonfatal opioid misuse to be $72.3 
billion.270  The CEA, although using Florence et al.’s estimates in its 
calculations, applied them to both prescription and heroin use disorders.271  
That divergence may result in the CEA’s study “understat[ing] the cost of 
nonfatal consequences of heroin as criminal justice system costs may be 
higher for illicit drugs . . . than for prescription drugs.”272  But “only 14 
percent of the 2.4 million individuals with an opioid use disorder in 2015 
presented with a heroin use disorder in isolation; others either had a 
prescription opioid disorder or both disorders present.”273  Thus, those 
individuals would have been accounted for in the Florence et al. study.274  
Accordingly, the CEA did not believe that the total cost estimate was 
significantly biased.275 
In sum, the CEA combined the estimated fatality costs and nonfatality 
costs to conclude that the total cost of the opioid crisis, including both 
prescription and illicit opioids, was between $293.3 billion and $622.1 
billion.276  The preferred age-dependent VSL calculation resulted in the 
estimated total cost being $504 billion.277  As noted above, that estimate is 
significantly higher than Florence et al.’s, as well as two earlier studies by 
Birnbaum et al.278  One, conducted in 2006, estimating costs for 2001, 
came to $11.5 billion in 2015 dollars.279  The other, conducted in 2001, 
estimating costs for 2007, came to $61.5 billion in 2015 dollars.280  Both 
Birnbaum et al. studies were limited to prescription opioids.281 
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3. Missouri Hospital Association and Hospital Industry Data Institute, 
Economic Costs of Opioid Epidemic in Missouri 
More recently, Missouri and the Hospital Industry Data Institute 
(HIDI) conducted a study of opioid costs for a single state.  The Economic 
Cost of the Opioid Epidemic in Missouri, published in January 2018, used 
the CEA’s methodology with updated CDC mortality data to estimate the 
economic burden of the opioid crisis at the state level, focusing on 
Missouri in 2016.282 
Missouri’s fatality costs were “derived by applying age-dependent 
estimates of the [VSL] to the . . . opioid overdose deaths for each age 
category from the CDC WONDER database.”283  Like the CEA’s report, 
HIDI adjusted the measures on CDC WONDER database to reflect the 
estimated twenty-four percent underreporting of opioid deaths.284  HIDI’s 
estimated nationwide economic costs of opioid-related fatalities came to 
$544 billion in 2016, “compared to the CEA’s fatality cost estimate of 
$431.7 billion in 2015.”285  Thus, the study suggests “a 26 percent 
increase, which is  largely explained by the 29 percent increase in opioid 
overdose deaths and 1.3 percent [U.S.] inflation between 2015 and 
2016.”286 
The CEA’s nonfatality costs were derived from Florence et al.’s 
estimate that individuals with opioid abuse/dependence cost “$30,000 per 
person in the form of reduced productivity, increased consumption of 
health care, law enforcement, and social services.”287  The most 
“significant” deviation from the CEA study was the used of state-level 
SAMSHA data on heroin use, rather than the CEA’s data on both 
prescription and illicit opioid use.288  The SAMSHA data were preferable 
because the Missouri study sought to “estimate between-state variation in 
the economic burden of opioid use disorder”.289  SAMSHA’s survey-
generated data revealed that 882,000 American adults reported using 
heroin between 2015 and 2016, compared to the CEA’s 2.4 million 
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estimate.290  Although about two-thirds lower, the HIDI study noted that 
the nonfatality costs were just “15 percent of the total economic costs of 
opioid use disorder in the CEA study.”291  As a result, HIDI’s “estimated 
nonfatality costs in the U.S. totaled $27.3 billion in 2016, compared to the 
CEA’s estimate of $72.3 billion in 2015.”292 
Adding the fatality and non-fatality opioid-related costs, the HIDI 
study estimated the “total economic cost of opioid use disorder and 
overdose deaths . . . to be $571.5 billion in 2016,” which was “13 percent 
higher than the CEA’s estimate of $504 billion in 2015.”293  Overall, the 
study concluded that the cost represented “3.1 percent of the national GDP 
of $18.5 trillion” for 2016.294 
HIDI then calculated state-level costs in Missouri, estimating that the 
opioid epidemic produced $519 million in nonfatality costs (considering 
only heroin use) and $12.1 billion in fatality-related costs, for a total of 
$12.63 billion in 2016, or “4.22 percent of the state’s total GDP.”295  That 
estimate placed Missouri “in the fourth quintile nationally,” and the “15th-
highest among the fifty states and the District of Columbia in terms of the 
total burden of opioid use disorder as a percent of overall economic 
activity.”296 
4. Massachusetts Department of Public Health, Opioid-Related 
Overdose Deaths in Massachusetts by Industry and Occupation 
Another state-level study that is potentially relevant to ours is a 
Massachusetts study of opioid-related deaths from 2011 to 2015.297  The 
Massachusetts Department of Public Health (MDPH) used information on 
state death certificates to explore different factors contributing to the 
differences in rates of fatal opioid overdose among workers in different 
industries and occupations.298  Based on ICD-10 codes, the MDPH 
identified death certificates for opioid-related overdose deaths.299  
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Additional death certificates were identified by searching the cause of 
death text fields for opioid-related terms for deaths, even if the death 
certificate did not receive an opioid-related death code.300  This process 
revealed “a total of 5,580 opioid-related overdose deaths in Massachusetts 
from 2011 to 2015.”301 
Of those identified certificates, 191 were excluded because they 
belonged to out-of-state residents, 319 were excluded because their 
occupation was “homemaker,” 208 were excluded because they “were 
unemployed or had never been employed,” 199 were excluded because 
they “were unable to work due to disability or another reason,” 160 were 
excluded because their occupation was “student,” and 2 were excluded 
because they were children.302  Another “199 individuals were excluded 
because their death certificates” did not provide enough information to 
classify them according to their employment “industry or occupation.”303  
That left 4,302 deaths that were usable for the study.304  The industries and 
occupations of the deceased were classified according to the North 
American Industry Classification System and the Standard Occupational 
Classification System respectively.305 
The study found that “[t]he opioid-related death rate for those 
employed in construction and extraction occupation was six times the 
average rate for all Massachusetts workers.”306 “Construction and 
extraction workers accounted for more than 24% of all opioid-related 
deaths among the working population” studied.307  Ninety-seven percent 
of that population were employed in construction.308  The rate of opioid-
related deaths for workers in farming, fishing, and forestry “was more than 
5 times the average rate for Massachusetts workers.”309  Seventy-four 
percent of those studied within this group worked in fishing 
occupations.310  “Other occupations with significantly higher than average 
rates of opioid-related deaths . . . included: material moving occupations; 
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installation, maintenance, and repair occupations; transportation 
occupations; production occupations; food preparation and serving related 
occupations; building and grounds cleaning and maintenance occupations; 
and healthcare support occupations.”311 
Analyzed based on sex of workers, the study found that occupations 
with higher-than-average rates of fatal opioid-related overdoses for men 
included farming, fishing, and forestry; construction and extraction; and 
material moving.312  While occupations with higher than average rates of 
fatal opioid-related overdose for women included healthcare support and 
food preparation and service.313 
Overall, “the rate of fatal opioid-related overdose was higher among 
workers employed in industries and occupations known to have high rates 
of work-related injuries and illness,” perhaps explained by the use of 
opioids to deal with “acute and chronic pain following work-related 
injury.”314  The study concluded that more research would be needed to 
characterize the contributions of such factors to opioid misuse and 
overdose.315  The study did not further correlate Massachusetts opioids 
deaths with costs, including lost productivity or other financial impacts. 
5. Georgia Studies on Opioid Impact 
Finally, two Georgia studies are potentially informative, yet still fail 
to capture the cost impact of opioids at the city or county level in any 
meaningful way.  First, the Georgia Department of Public Health (DPH), 
Opioid Overdose Surveillance 316 included a study of death certificates, 
similar to the Massachusetts study.  DPH derived data of opioid and 
overdose-related deaths from “the death certificates of all deaths occurring 
in Georgia during 2016” that were in DPH’s Vital Records.317  Drug 
overdoses included “prescription, over-the-counter, or illicit drugs.”318  
DPH looked for death certificates with ICD-10 codes with opioids 
(prescription and illicit) as the underlying cause of death; those with ICD-
10 codes that had multiple cause-of-death codes (specifically T40.0-
                                                          
 311.   Id. (exact rates excluded). 
 312.   Id. at 1, 11. 
 313.   Id.  
 314.   Id. at 1. 
 315.   Id. at 20. 
 316.   GA. DEP’T. PUB. HEALTH, OPIOID OVERDOSE SURVEILLANCE (2016), 
https://dph.georgia.gov/sites/dph.georgia.gov/files/OPIOID%20OVERDOSE%20SURVEILLANCE
.Georgia.2016.pdf [https://perma.cc/NX5B-CVMW] [hereinafter DPH 2016]. 
 317.   Id. at 4. 
 318.   Id. 
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T40.4, T40.6); and those with any “cause of death text field” containing 
certain keywords (e.g. heroine, fentanyl, acetyl fentanyl, furanyl fentanyl, 
methadone, etc.).319  “Nonfatal overdose counts were derived from 
Georgia hospital discharge inpatient and [emergency department] visit 
data, and included all [emergency department] visits or hospitalizations 
occurring in a non-federal acute care hospital in Georgia . . . with a 
discharge diagnosis indicating acute drug overdose during 2016.”320  DPH 
looked for ICD-10CM codes as the principle diagnosis (T40.0X–T40.3X, 
T40.60, & T40.69) and a sixth character (“1-4, and a 7th character of A or 
missing”).321  From this data, the study concluded that “[f]rom 2010 to 
2016, . . . opioid-involved overdose deaths increased in Georgia by 
117%.”322  Moreover, in 2016 there were 2,895 emergency department 
visits related to opioid overdoses, and 2,499 inpatient hospitalizations 
related with opioid overdoses.323 
2016 is the only completed study, but DPH has collected similar data 
for 2017324 and part of 2018,325 including a county-level data on fatal and 
nonfatal overdoses for 2017.326  While these data are salient, their 
usefulness in estimating city or county-level costs are limited for reasons 
explained more fully below.327  The hospital emergency department and 
acute care costs are not particularly relevant because cities and counties 
generally do not pay for hospital services, other than under limited 
circumstances, discussed more fully below.328  Overdose mortality data 
are very helpful in deriving coroner costs associated with opioid-related 
deaths but are harder to translate into other meaningful local government 
costs. 
Second, the Substance Abuse and Research Alliance (SARA) 2017 
                                                          
 319.   Id. at 4. 
 320.   Id. at 5. 
 321.   Id. 
 322.   Id. at 3, 6. 
 323.   Id. at 3, 20.  
 324.   GA. DEP’T  PUB. HEALTH, OPIOID OVERDOSE SURVEILLANCE: PRELIMINARY REPORT, 
GEORGIA, 2017 (2017), https://dph.georgia.gov/sites/dph.georgia.gov/files/2017%20Preliminary 
%20Georgia%20Opioid%20Overdose%20Report.pdf [https://perma.cc/4C7F-AR8W]. 
 325.   See GA. DEP’T PUB. HEALTH, Drug Overdose Syndromic Surveillance Monthly Reports, 
https://dph.georgia.gov/drug-overdose-syndromic-surveillance-monthly-reports [https://perma.cc/ 
SD4K-HHH8] (last visited Apr. 22, 2019). 
 326.   GA. DEP’T  PUB. HEALTH, OPIOID OVERDOSE SURVEILLANCE COUNTY LEVEL DATA 
TABLES, GEORGIA, 2017 (2017), https://dph.georgia.gov/sites/dph.georgia.gov/files/2017% 
20Preliminary%20Georgia%20Opioid%20Overdose%20Data%20tables%2012.19.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/BV76-YWZ6]. 
 327.   See generally infra Part IV. 
 328.   See infra Part IV.B.1. 
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White Paper, Prescription Opioids and Heroin Epidemic in Georgia, 
provides a comprehensive overview of the scope of the problem in 
Georgia, with limited mention of costs.329  SARA is a program of the 
Georgia Prevention Project.330  The study was initiated “in April of 
2016 . . . to assist the Georgia State Senate Study Committee on Opioids 
and Heroin.”331  SARA found that 900, or 68%, of the 1,307 drug overdose 
deaths in Georgia in 2015 were due to opioid overdoses including 
heroin.332  “Further,” Georgia experienced “a statistically significant 
increase in the drug overdose death rate . . . from 2013 to 2014, and 
overdose deaths tripled between 1999 and 2013.”333  Georgia is “[a]mong 
the top 11 states with the most prescription opioid overdose deaths,” and 
“55 of Georgia’s 159 counties had higher drug overdose rates than the U.S. 
average in 2014.”334  Georgia’s rural counties are especially impacted.335  
“Sixty percent of the 55 counties with drug overdose rates higher than the 
national average are located in rural areas.”336  Those areas already 
struggle to provide access to substance use disorder treatment, including 
medication assisted treatment (MAT).337  SARA estimated that “two-
thirds of all counties in Georgia,” and more than three-quarters of rural 
counties, “have limited or no access to an evidence-based practice for 
opioid use disorder.”338 
Regarding costs, the study briefly noted that “[t]he economic burden 
of prescription opioid overdose, misuse and disorders in the U.S. is 
estimated at $78.5 billion in 2013 with over one third of this amount 
coming from increased health care and substance use treatment costs 
($28.9 billion).”339  The study went on to note that “[t]he health care costs 
associated with opioid misuse in Georgia alone were estimated at $447 
million in 2007 with estimated per-capita costs at $44.”340  That amount, 
according to some estimates, represents an eighty percent increase since 
                                                          
 329.   SUBSTANCE ABUSE RES. ALLIANCE, PRESCRIPTION OPIOIDS AND HEROIN EPIDEMIC IN 
GEORGIA—A WHITE PAPER (2017), http://www.senate.ga.gov/sro/Documents/StudyCommRpts/ 
OpioidsAppendix.pdf [https://perma.cc/WL6L-FYPS] [hereinafter SARA 2017]. 
 330.   Id. at 3. 
 331.   Id.  
 332.   Id. at 5. 
 333.   Id. 
 334.   Id. 
 335.   Id. 
 336.   Id. 
 337.   Id. at 5, 23. 
 338.   Id. at 5 (noting that “77 percent of rural counties in Georgia have limited or no access to an 
evidence-based practice for opioid use disorder”). 
 339.   Id. at 7. 
 340.   Id. 
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2007.341  “Hospitalizations related to opioid use and misuse in Georgia 
also have skyrocketed, from about 302,000 in 2002 to about 520,000 in 
2012.”342  Moreover, SARA suggested that inpatient care costs “more than 
doubled” from 2002 to 2012, “rising to $15 billion in 2012.”343  Again, 
even accepting the accuracy of those reports, the figures do little to capture 
city- and county-level costs associated with the opioid epidemic.  For local 
government plaintiffs to demonstrate damages in the litigation, or even for 
other local governments to develop meaningful budgets and other plans to 
address it, more specific cost estimates are needed. 
B. Limits of Existing Cost Studies for Assessing Local Government 
Costs 
The aforementioned research, while helpful in understanding the 
macro-impacts of opioid abuse, ultimately do little to help Georgia local 
governments assess their specific costs in dealing with this problem.  First, 
at least for purposes of litigation, local governments are trying to measure 
only direct, rather than direct and indirect, costs.  Second, estimates based 
on national averages cannot be applied to individual cases.  The following 
discussion briefly explains the limits of the existing studies, highlighting 
the need for our project. 
Florence et al., CEA, and HIDI all estimate the cost of the opioid 
epidemic from loss of life, which represents the largest impact of the crisis.  
Those costs, however, are not direct losses for local governments.  The 
direct costs from opioid deaths for a local government would be potential 
lost sales and property tax revenue, i.e., the deceased person not 
purchasing taxable goods.  Theoretically, the government could estimate 
that lost sales tax income by using data from the Bureau of Labor 
Statistics’ Consumer Expenditure Survey.344  That consumer spending 
data, however, represents average spending nationally or for a region of 
the county; thus, again it reveals little about any individual city or county.  
Additionally, local governments would be making assumptions about the 
potential earnings and expenditures of specific persons who died from 
opioid overdoses in their jurisdictions and the residential duration of the 
deceased in their respective communities.  A local government would 
likely have trouble verifying any purported lost sales tax based on those 
vague assumptions. 
                                                          
 341.   Id. 
 342.   Id. 
 343.   Id. at 7, 15. 
 344.   See Bureau LAB. STAT., Consumer Expenditure Surveys, https://www.bls.gov/cex/ 
[https://perma.cc/3KHE-8KWW] (last visited Apr. 22, 2019). 
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Foregone or diminished property taxes from drug overdoses are even 
less likely.  Property taxes would be lost only if, first, the person who died 
from an overdose owned property, and, second, the owned property 
declined in value because the person died.  Assuming that the deceased 
were a property owner, there is no reason to think that simply because a 
person died of an opioid overdose that her property would be of less worth 
any more than if a person died of some other cause, such as a heart attack 
or cancer.  Property taxes could be adversely affected by the opioid crisis 
if a neighborhood experienced an overall decline in desirability, such as 
having significant blight or high numbers of home foreclosures.345  Even 
so, it would be difficult to attribute those impacts to opioids alone.  Those 
same neighborhood challenges are more typically the result of high 
unemployment and other socioeconomic challenges which may contribute 
to higher rates of opioid abuse but cannot be attributed to the drug problem 
in isolation.346  A local government would have difficulty determining 
whether a neighborhood is in decline because of opioid abuse or these 
other societal problems, which are often the antecedents to widespread 
drug addiction. 
Florence et al. also considered the economic cost of general lost 
productivity from opioid addiction, such as absenteeism and persons being 
incarcerated.  Again, local governments would not be able to consider lost 
productivity of its entire population as direct costs.  Lost productivity is 
different from the direct costs of incarceration which are considered in our 
study. 
The Florence et al., CEA, and HIDI studies measure the direct costs 
to law enforcement and the courts from opioid addiction.  To be sure, local 
governments bear significant portions of those costs, including time of 
police officers, sheriff deputies, jails, and courts.  Nonetheless, 
methodological problems prevent local governments from applying the 
averages used in those studies to estimate law enforcement costs.  
Nonetheless, the averages used in those studies to estimate law 
enforcement costs cannot be applied to individual local governments for 
their individual cost estimations because of methodological problems.  
Namely, national averages, such as the percent of property crime 
associated with drug use, are based on many inputs.  Any particular local 
                                                          
 345.   See, e.g., Press Release, Ohio House of Representatives 133rd Gen. Assembly, Bipartisan 
“Blight Bill” Would Protect Neighborhoods from Dangerous Properties, Lawmaker Says (Jan. 26, 
2018), http://www.ohiohouse.gov/adam-c-miller/press/bipartisan-blight-bill-would-protect-neighbor 
hoods-from-dangerous-properties-lawmaker-says [https://perma.cc/TJZ7-MVDJ]. 
 346.   Nabarun Dasgupta et al., Opioid Crisis: No Easy Fix to Its Social and Economic 
Determinants, 108 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 182, 182–84 (Feb. 2018), https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/ 
pmc/articles/PMC5846593/pdf/AJPH.2017.304187.pdf [https://perma.cc/MF67-YH35]. 
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government may or may not be similar to the national average because of 
variations in community income, unemployment, major industries, and 
other factors. 
The MDPH study that examined industries with higher rates of opioid 
addiction offers interesting information, but does not help local 
governments estimate their direct expenditures due to opioid abuse.  
Rather, this study appears most helpful in understanding potential causes 
of opioid addiction and offering insights for focused drug abuse prevention 
education and other interventions in certain industries.  In communities 
with industries associated with higher rates of opioid addiction, local 
governments could direct efforts to work with those industry and union 
leaders to educate employees about potential opioid addiction and employ 
other targeted prevention and treatment efforts. 
Since the MDPH study did not indicate that local government 
employees experience a higher rate of opioid addiction, the study is not 
instructive on city or county human resources costs for public employees’ 
opioid use disorders.  The study does not suggest particularly pronounced 
direct costs on local governments as an employer in terms of medical and 
substance abuse treatment, or high employee attrition or lost productivity.  
Even assuming opioid addiction among employees were an issue for a 
local government, the MDPH methodology does not help to quantify costs.  
The local government human resource department still would need to pull 
employee health records based on ICD-10 codes347 and apply other 
methodologies discussed below.348 
Florence et al., CEA, HID, DPH 2016, and SARA 2017 all look at 
health care costs associated with opioid addiction.  Those costs, while a 
significant component of the epidemic, largely are not applicable to cities 
and counties in Georgia because they generally do not pay for hospital 
services, other than under limited circumstances, including gratuitous 
uncompensated care grants to safety net hospitals, city and county 
employee health costs, and prisoner medical expenses at the local hospital.  
We unpack the various health care expenditures more fully in Part IV. 
The overdose mortality data provided in the Georgia studies, DPH 
2016, and SARA 2017, may be helpful to local governments in estimating 
coroner costs, which are somewhat standardized, but are harder to translate 
into other meaningful cost estimates. 
                                                          
 347.   See Using International Classification of Diseases (ICD) Codes to Assess Opioid-Related 
Overdose Deaths, SUBSTANCE ABUSE & MENTAL HEALTH SERVS. ADMIN. CTR. FOR THE 
APPLICATION OF PREVENTION TECH., https://mnprc.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/01/using-icd-10-
codes-to-assess-opioid-related-overdose-deaths.pdf [https://perma.cc/J838-9ETE] (last visited Apr. 
22, 2019). 
 348.   See infra Part IV.A. 
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In sum, the applicability of these existing studies on the cost of opioid 
addiction to local governments for calculating direct cost estimates is 
either extremely limited because of the generalizations used in the research 
or simply because local governments do not bear the burden of the 
expense, such as health care. 
IV. LOCAL GOVERNMENT OPIOID COST STUDY 
With that background on the opioid litigation and existing studies 
estimating macro-level costs and state-level incidence of opioid use 
disorder, we turn now to describing our study methodology and findings.  
The goal of the study was not to derive quantifiable hard data on the three 
counties’ opioids costs or to create damages claims that would be 
admissible in court.  Rather, we sought to reality test our existing 
understanding of local government operations, budgeting, and planning to 
better understand where the costs of this epidemic might appear.  We 
looked beyond the Florence et al. categories of health care, law 
enforcement, and lost productivity to capture a broader array of potential 
local government costs.  Moreover, we sought on-the-ground experiences 
and anecdotes from department heads, rather than extrapolating from 
statistical studies, to more fully understand the financial impact of the 
opioid epidemic at the local level.  Our findings may be useful to MDL 
and other litigants but also other local governments seeking to get a better 
grasp on the effect of this issue on their operations so that they can make 
appropriate budget and planning decisions going forward. 
A. Methodology 
Our study consisted of unstructured qualitative interviews with two 
dozen identified local government department heads in three Georgia 
counties, as well as a handful other governmental and non-profit 
organizations’ representatives, suggested by other interviewees through 
informal snowball sampling.  In each of the three counties, we made initial 
contact with the County Administrator, who is the chief executive officer 
of the county responsible for the day-to-day operations of the county.  
After the County Administrators agreed to participate in our study, we 
asked them to contact the relevant department heads, alerting them to our 
project and asking for their cooperation.  With that introduction, we then 
contacted and requested interviews with administrative heads of the 
following units: Coroner, Law Enforcement (Police, Drug Enforcement 
Authority (DEA)), Correctional Institute (typically run by the Sheriff), 
Court Administration (a local governmental unit overseeing various 
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courts), Parks and Recreation/Leisure Services, Libraries, Treatment 
Services, Human Resources, Finance/Budget, Hospitals, Emergency 
Communications (911), Emergency Medical Services (EMS), Code 
Enforcement, Solicitor General (Prosecutor), Fire, Solid Waste, and 
Community Services.  We also reached out to representatives of the local 
private, non-profit hospitals and, in one case, the school superintendent. 
We selected the three counties by the mostly unscientific method of 
localities that were plaintiffs in the opioid MDL and where we had 
preexisting contacts with the County Administrators or other officials and, 
thus, a better chance of response and cooperation.  The three Georgia 
counties surveyed were Athens-Clarke (where the University of Georgia 
is located, and which has a combined city-county government),349 Hall 
(County Seat: Gainesville),350 and Decatur (County Seat: Bainbridge).351  
Subject to the opportunities above, the three counties were chosen for their 
diversity: Decatur County is very rural, located in southwest Georgia.  
Athens-Clarke and Hall are in northeast Georgia; the former is fairly 
urban/suburban while the latter is mix of urban and rural.  In total, we 
interviewed twenty-six local government administrators in the three 
counties and five non-local-governmental administrators, including the 
Decatur County school superintendent; the executive director of Decatur 
County’s private, nonprofit hospital; the director of government affairs for 
the private nonprofit health system serving Hall County; a representative 
of the private EMS company that serves Decatur County; and a 
representative of the drug treatment center for Hall county, for a total 
survey of thirty-one people.  Each interview lasted from thirty minutes to 
one hour.  Most interviews were conducted by phone, although several of 
the Athens-Clarke County interviews were in-person. 
The officials with whom we spoke represented services that we 
believed would experience direct, indirect, or even intangible or future 
costs related to opioid use.  In describing the limits of existing opioid 
financial impact studies above, we focused on direct costs, which would 
be most relevant to the litigation.  For purposes of this study, however, we 
wanted to collect as much information as possible, given the multiple aims.  
Thus, we included those services that are typically mentioned when 
considering the cost of opioids—jails, courts, fire departments, EMS, and 
hospitals—but also those that have received less attention such as libraries, 
                                                          
 349.   Athens-Clark County Unified Gov’t., https://www.athensclarkecounty.com 
[https://perma.cc/VF2V-GDLB] (last visited Apr. 22, 2019). 
 350.   Hall County Georgia, https://www.hallcounty.org [https://perma.cc/4VLE-5K4H] (last 
visited Apr. 22, 2019). 
 351.   Welcome to Decatur County Georgia, https://www.decaturcountyga.gov 
[https://perma.cc/TUW9-SZ4Q] (last visited Apr. 22, 2019). 
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parks, solid waste, human resources, and code enforcement.  In total, our 
interviews include representatives from seventeen different local 
government or non-profit services. 
We were fairly strict in our identification of truly local government 
costs, which meant that we did not collect information about some costs 
alleged repeatedly in the complaints.  For example, the complaints allege 
costs associated with child care for children of parents suffering opioid-
related addiction or incapacitation.352  Those costs, however, typically do 
not fall on local governments in Georgia.  The Division of Children and 
Family Services (DCFS) and foster care are state-funded353 (aside from 
some targeted local programs, captured elsewhere in our study).  Likewise, 
school districts, which could incur costs associated with children of 
opioid-affected parents, are separately funded by local property taxes and 
a state supplement to underfunded counties; thus, school districts are not 
part of city and county government budgets.354  The complaints also 
alleged opioid-related medical treatment for both opioid-addicted babies 
and adults.355  We did speak to hospitals, even though a very small fraction 
(if any) of their revenue may come from local governments, such as where 
localities have expressly granted indigent care funds to safety net 
hospitals.356  Some community hospitals operate under state law357 
allowing the issuance of revenue bonds or certificates to fund construction 
or other projects.358  But, like school districts, hospital authorities are 
separate legal and budget entities.  Otherwise, Medicare (federal), 
Medicaid (state and federal), and private (insurers or charity) would be 
paying for such treatment.  With respect to the complaints regarding 
opioid-affected babies and NAS,359 the bulk of neonatal intensive care unit 
                                                          
 352.   See supra note 14. 
 353.   GA. DEP’T OF HUMAN SERVS., JOINT APPROPRIATIONS COMMITTEE PRESENTATION FY 
2016 AMENDED AND FY 2017 GENERAL BUDGET 20–28 (Jan. 19, 2016), http://dhs.georgia.gov/ 
sites/dhs.georgia.gov/files/AFY16%20and%20FY17%20Budget%20-%20Joint%20Approriations% 
20Committee%20Presentation%20as%20of%201-19-16.pdf [https://perma.cc/AHX4-3F75]; Melissa 
Johnson, Georgia Human Services Budget Primer for State Fiscal Year 2018, GA. BUDGET & POL’Y 
INST. (July 12, 2017), http://gbpi.org/2017/georgia-human-services-budget-primer-state-fiscal-year-
2018/ [https://perma.cc/6UCL-4RUP]. 
 354.   ELTON DAVIS & ISABEL Ruthotto, CTR. FOR STATE & LOCAL FIN., FINANCING GEORGIA’S 
SCHOOLS: A 2015 BRIEFING 12 (Oct. 20, 2015), http://cslf.gsu.edu/files/2015/10/Financing-Georgias-
Schools_October-2015.pdf [https://perma.cc/Z46K-K5WX]. 
 355.   See supra note 14. 
 356.   See, e.g., Indigent Care, FLOYD STRAIGHTFORWARD, http://floydstraightforward.org/ 
relevant-topic/indigent-care/ [https://perma.cc/A2XP-56JX] (last visited Apr. 22, 2019) (noting that a 
number of counties do receive local government funding, but Floyd County does not). 
 357.   GA. CODE ANN. § 31-7-72 (West 2010). 
 358.   GA. CODE ANN. § 31-7-78 (West 2010). 
 359.   See supra note 14.  
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costs for infants, as well as other emergency room and inpatient costs of 
treatment, would fall on hospitals ledgers, with minimal to no city or 
county funding.  Likewise, local public health departments in Georgia are 
state funded.360 
At the same time, we cast a wider net than the damages alleged in the 
lawsuits, seeking to identify not only documented costs associated with 
opioids but the full range of past and potential future financial impacts of 
this crisis.  Thus, we imagined law enforcement costs associated with not 
only drug crimes and overdoses but also related crimes (shoplifting, theft, 
housing code violations).  In addition, it is conceivable that libraries will 
be managing indigent, impaired, or even overdosing clients as places of 
public access.361  We included parks and leisure to capture costs associated 
with homeless camps and needle clean-up.362  Solid waste was included 
because of the possibility of needles or other opioid-related contaminants 
ending up in wastewater and sewage treatment plants.363  We ended up not 
interviewing any representatives of those departments, however, after 
anecdotal reports that any such problem in Georgia was nascent at best.  
Likewise, we considered reaching out to local government planning 
departments to assess potential lost opportunities for economic 
development, but, again, aside from anecdotes, there seemed little specific 
data to report, at least at this time.364  Because of the open-ended nature of 
our interviews, we also discovered other potential opioid-related costs that 
we had not previously identified. 
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 364.   See, e.g., Stephen Fowler, The Cost of Opioid Addiction Is More Than Dollars and Cents, 
GA. PUB. BROADCASTING (Aug. 29, 2017), http://www.gpbnews.org/post/cost-opioid-addiction-
more-dollars-and-cents [https://perma.cc/XF5D-83CF] (discussing the economic effects of opioid 
abuse, such as “unfilled jobs and failed drug tests.”). 
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B. Findings 
We predicted that identified costs would fall into one of three 
categories: (1) “easy,” readily identified opioid-related costs that cities and 
counties already are tracking; (2) “medium,” potentially identifiable 
opioid-related costs that cities and counties could track if given the tools 
and resources (e.g., spreadsheets, templates, or additional data collection 
fields or information feedback loops); and (3) “hard,” indirect and 
intangible costs that are real but very difficult to quantify other than on a 
macro level.  As it turned out, we found relatively few categories of “easy” 
costs; a larger bucket of “medium” costs; and an indefinite number of 
“hard” costs. 
Those results suggests that local government plaintiffs may be 
challenged to demonstrate damages for purposes of the MDL lawsuit or 
settlement.  Indeed, early indications from the MDL suggest that the task 
has been harder than expected, with at least one ninety-day extension 
already granted on the Government Plaintiff Fact Sheet, docketed on June 
19, 2018.365  That discovery request calls for extensive, detailed 
disclosures all dating back ten years, including a much longer list of 
officials, ranging from mayors and councilmembers, to wardens and fire 
chiefs; annual budgets and actual expenditures for each category of 
damages claimed; claim-specific information, including each doctor and 
pharmacy that has been the target of a law enforcement or administrative 
investigation; number of overdose deaths and drug(s) involved; and every 
medical insurance plan or carrier, behavioral health carrier, workers 
compensation program, pharmacy benefit manager and other third-party 
administrator.366  The Fact Sheet also calls for supporting documents, 
including dispensing, prescribing, and distribution records, city council, 
county commission, and county health commission meeting minutes, 
again dating back ten years.367 
The original ninety-day deadline for this production expired on 
September 18, 2018 (just a few days before this live symposium was held), 
but was extended for another ninety days, until December 17, 2018, 
suggesting that response was perhaps more challenging for government 
plaintiffs than initially anticipated.368  Further extensions were granted to 
                                                          
 365.   Fact Sheet Implementation Order, In re Nat’l Prescription Opiate Litig., No. 17-2804 (N.D. 
Ohio June 19, 2018), ECF No. 638. 
 366.   Id. 
 367.   Id. 
 368.   Order on Discovery in Track One Cases, and Amending Prior Orders at 7, In re: Nat’l 
Prescription Opiate Lit., No. 17-MD-2804. 
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various localities affected by natural disasters, including fires in California 
and hurricanes on the East and Gulf Coasts.369  As the case proceeds, the 
plaintiffs may find that their participation is not costless, data is difficult 
to collect, and the demonstrable costs for any particular locality are 
modest.  As just one indication, a local government lawsuit filed in 
Connecticut state court was dismissed on standing grounds because the 
city plaintiffs could not demonstrate cognizable injury.370  Thus, our local 
government cost study remains highly salient as it relates to the litigation 
specifically, and local government planning more generally. 
Our findings confirm the suggestion above that local governments will 
face significant challenges in trying to fully capture all service costs 
associated with the opioid epidemic.  That said, local governments should 
be able to quantify some direct costs, assuming multiple funding streams 
(federal, state, local, and private) can be disaggregated.  In terms of how 
to determine costs, the primary challenge will be tracking service effort.  
How much of a provided service was directly or indirectly related to opioid 
use?  Once service effort is known, calculating costs from that effort 
should be relatively straight forward, such as total hourly cost of 
employees’ time, or better yet, cost per service episode that involved 
opioids. 
Data management is also a critical factor in a local government’s 
ability to track costs.  Resource and personnel limits alone create 
significant challenges for local government plaintiffs to respond to the 
detailed MDL Fact Sheet or other inquiries.  Those governments that have 
had the resources and interest in tracking services, such as creating a 
database for each prisoner that includes the reason for arrest in a 
searchable format, may have an easier time researching current and past 
opioid-related service costs.  Smaller communities often translate to rural 
and poorer local governments, which typically lack financial resources to 
create and staff to manage sophisticated data management systems.  
Accordingly, we anticipate that those communities will face the greatest 
difficulty tracking cost data.  Unfortunately, often it is these poorer 
communities that are most severely impacted by the opioid epidemic as a 
                                                          
 369.   Motion for Extension of Time to Respond to Plaintiffs’ Fact Sheets on Behalf of Ctys. 
Affected by Recent Nat. Disasters, In re: Nat’l Prescription Opiate Lit., No. 17-MD-2804. 
 370.   Connecticut Judge Dismisses Claims Against Opioid Manufacturers, FDA NEWS (Jan. 18, 
2019), https://www.fdanews.com/articles/189910-connecticut-judge-dismisses-claims-against-
opioid-manufacturers [https://perma.cc/NWR6-ZRMT]; Paul Schott, Judge Dismisses Local CT 
Lawsuits Against Purdue Pharma, STAMFORD ADVOC. (last updated Jan. 9, 2019, 5:57 PM), 
https://www.stamfordadvocate.com/business/article/Judge-dismisses-local-CT-lawsuits-against-
Purdue-13521470.php [https://perma.cc/ZB4Y-VG7Q]. 
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percentage of population or aggregate community impact.371 
It is important to note that opioid lawsuits address only direct 
damages, those that can be quantified.372  Governments will not be able to 
recoup indirect costs such as those related to the long-term impacts on a 
child whose parents are addicted and thus may be neglected.  States, in 
separate lawsuits,373 may be able to track and recoup costs related to foster 
care and other services but not the child’s lost potential caused by the 
trauma that she experiences.  Governments cannot measure the lost 
economic growth and tax dollars from companies that choose not to be 
located in a community because of concerns about not having an able 
workforce.  Moreover, local governments will not be able to recover the 
opportunity costs from providing services for opioid-related issues.  We 
turn next to describing the three categories of costs—easy, medium, and 
hard to quantify—identified through our study. 
1. Easy to Quantify 
We categorize opioid-related costs as “easy” to track and calculate 
when existing tracking systems would readily identify opioids as being a 
reason for the service effort.  In most cases, that means there is an existing, 
extrinsic reason to track persons who use or sell opioids, or the particular 
cost is opioid-specific, such as costs associated with the opioid overdose 
drug, naloxone (or Narcan).374  For local government accounting purposes, 
the need to correlate expenditures with any particular individual receiving 
                                                          
 371.   See SARA 2017, supra note 329, at 5 (regarding opioid impact in rural Georgia); Drug 
Overdose in Rural America, CDC, https://www.cdc.gov/ruralhealth/drug-overdose/ [https://perma.cc/ 
5TDJ-UF4X] (last reviewed Oct. 19, 2017). 
 372.   See, e.g., Gov’t Plaintiff Fact Sheet, In re: Nat’l Prescription Opiate Lit., No. 17-MD-2804 
(requesting information on budget and expenditures, suspicious pharmaceutical prescriptions, and 
opioid-related meeting agendas). 
 373.   See supra notes 79–81 and accompanying text (discussing state attorney general lawsuits); 
see also Allison Sherry, Opioid Crisis Is Sure to Be Factor in the Campaign for State Attorney 
General, COLO. PUB. RADIO (July 10, 2018), http://www.cpr.org/news/story/opioid-crisis-is-sure-to-
be-factor-in-the-campaign-for-state-attorney-general [https://perma.cc/V8MJ-4TRE]; Press Release, 
Office of Attorney Gen. Chris Carr, Carr Announces Lawsuit Against Opioid Manufacturers and 
Distributors (Jan. 3, 2019), https://law.georgia.gov/press-releases/2019-01-03/carr-announces-
lawsuit-against-opioid-manufacturers-and-distributors [https://perma.cc/8GCA-6N34]. 
 374.   See generally Opioid Overdose Reversal with Naloxone (Narcan, Evzio), NAT’L INST. ON 
DRUG ABUSE (last updated Apr. 2018), https://www.drugabuse.gov/related-topics/opioid-overdose-
reversal-naloxone-narcan-evzio [https://perma.cc/3DC8-DNB5] (last visited Apr. 22, 2019) 
(describing Naloxone and how it is administered); Surgeon General’s Advisory on Naloxone and 
Opioid Overdose, U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., https://www.surgeongeneral.gov/ 
priorities/opioid-overdose-prevention/naloxone-advisory.html [https://perma.cc/8PT6-XNZJ] (last 
visited Mar. 31, 2019) (stressing the importance of the availability of Naloxone to assist in preventing 
overdoses). 
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the services—much less for discrete indications—is relatively rare.  For 
the most part, government is in the business of providing public goods to 
a population, not in the business of providing fee-for-service benefits to 
particular individuals, as explained more fully below.375  As a result of 
those features of local government management and accounting, the task 
of quantifying opioid-related costs turns out to be harder than we expected.  
The category of easy-to-quantify costs includes court administration fees; 
coroner investigations; naloxone; some medical care costs, including 
EMS, services to city and county employees, and indigent care grants; and 
grants or other spending earmarked for opioid treatment or related issues. 
One set of costs that should be fairly easy to track are those associated 
with court administration.  Courts have an extrinsic reason to correlate 
expenditures with opioids; namely, court administrators routinely track 
cases with the associated criminal codes, which indicate the nature of the 
crime and illicit substance involved.376  Thus, opioid services are known 
through the charges against the defendant.  For example, the Athens-
Clarke County Clerk of the Superior Court377 explained that she inputs a 
variety of information into her docket management system for each 
defendant, including the type of Georgia criminal code violation.378  To 
find opioid-related dockets, she just has to search the specific code 
number.379  Thus, we could derive a fairly reliable cost estimate for the 
court’s opioid-related services. 
Starting with those data entries, we could determine the percentage of 
criminal cases related to opioids.  Hypothetically, let’s suppose the court’s 
opioid-related effort is ten percent.  Second, we would determine the 
percentage of court administration total costs that are related to criminal 
cases.  Suppose that forty percent of the court’s administrative staff are 
dedicated to criminal cases (hypothetically, two of the five total staff).  
Then, the department’s total operating budget is multiplied by forty 
percent, resulting in a criminal case budget.  Forty percent of a 
hypothetical budget of $500,000 equals $200,000.  That $200,000 portion 
                                                          
 375.   See infra note 439 and accompanying text (discussing public goods and limits on the 
benefits-received model of local government service delivery). 
 376.   GA. CODE Ann. § 16-13-24 (West 2009) (establishing five schedules of controlled 
substances); see id. § 16-13-25 (West 2009 & Supp. 2013) (listing Schedule I controlled substances); 
see id. § 16-13-26 (listing Schedule II controlled substances and explicitly referring to opiates) (West 
2009 & Supp. 2013); see also id. § 15-6-61 (listing superior court clerk’s duties). 
 377.   See generally Superior Court, ATHENS-CLARKE CTY., https://www.athensclarkecounty 
.com/579/Superior-Court [https://perma.cc/J3N3-JSKT] (last visited Apr. 14, 2019); Clerk of Superior 
& State Courts, ATHENS-CLARKE CTY., https://www.athensclarkecounty.com/324/Clerk-of-Superior-
State-Courts [https://perma.cc/C2VL-C9MW] (last visited Apr. 14, 2019). 
 378.  Telephone Interview with Betty Logan, Clerk of Courts, Athens-Clarke County (July 25, 
2018). 
 379.  Id. 
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of the budget then is multiplied by the opioid effort of ten percent for an 
opioid-related service cost of $20,000.  In sum, in our hypothetical 
example, opioid-related services amount to four percent of the total court 
administration costs. 
Fig. 1: Hypothetical Calculation of Court Costs 
Total department budget: $500,000 
Percentage of criminal cases involving opioids: 10% (based on docket, 
criminal codes) 
Percentage of total costs related to criminal cases: 40% (2 out of 5 staff) 
(500,000)(40%) = $200,000 
___________________________________________ 
(200,000)(10%) = $20,000 (opioid cases represent 4% of total budget) 
Sadly, opioid-related services in a local coroner’s office also are easy 
to track.  Georgia Law requires all suspected overdose cases in Georgia to 
be sent to the Georgia Bureau of Investigation (GBI) for a toxicology 
screening, which will show whether opioids were in the decedent’s system 
at the time of death.380  Costs related to an opioid overdose include the 
GBI toxicology report, cost to transport the body, and local coroner’s 
office staff time in locating a person who will claim the body.381  
Additional costs may be incurred when no one will claim the body and the 
county must get approval from the Superior Court for a pauper burial, or 
if the county must embalm and retain the body for a period of time before 
                                                          
 380.   Rhonda Cook, At the State’s Morgue, a Backlog Has Grown Amid Opioid Epidemic, 
ATLANTA J.-CONST. (Sept. 14, 2017), https://www.ajc.com/news/local/the-state-morgue-backlog-
has-grown-amid-opioid-epidemic/9gtLuiR2ND6wcgcuGGpffN/ [https://perma.cc/WC2V-LRZQ]; 
Medical Examiner’s Office, GA. BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, https://gbi.georgia.gov/medical-
examiners-office [https://perma.cc/AEW9-JNP2] (last visited Apr. 22, 2019); GA. CODE ANN. § 45-
16-24 (West 2003 & Supp. 2015) (describing when notification to the coroner or county medical 
examiner is required upon discovery of a death under listed circumstances); see id. § 45-16-25 (West 
2003 & Supp. 2013) (describing coroners’ duties upon receipt of notice described in § 45-16-24); see 
id. § 45-16-27 (describing when coroners shall require an inquest); see id. § 45-16-27.1 (West 2003) 
(describing when autopsies are required). 
 381.   See Frequently Asked Questions About Autopsies, GA. BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, 
https://gbi.georgia.gov/sites/gbi.georgia.gov/files/related_files/site_page/88332299Autopsy%20FAQ
s.pdf [https://perma.cc/6XZM-68DD] (last visited Apr., 14, 2019) (detailing when an autopsy is 
required under state law, how autopsies are paid for, the coroner’s obligation to transport the body to 
and from morgue, and indicating how long an autopsy typically takes to complete).  
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investigation.382  So, again, there is a reason extrinsic to local government 
function to collect the opioid-specific data related to coroners’ costs. 
Another easily identifiable cost, applicable to various local 
government departments, is the cost of naloxone, including the cost of 
acquiring and storing the drug as well as training employees on its use.  
Naloxone may be stocked by police, fire, EMS, as well as libraries and 
schools (although schools are not local government costs, as explained 
above).383  Our interviews, as well as media sources,384 revealed an 
increasing number of local government departments that are stocking 
naloxone and training their staff to use it.385  For services where opioid-
related issues will be minimal, such as drug use in a public library, costs 
should be limited to purchasing naloxone and training staff on how to use 
it.  These costs would be fairly easy to isolate: the cost of the drug and the 
hourly cost of employees for the time spent in training.  Any department 
that purchases naloxone (e.g., police, fire/EMS) can track this direct cost 
through its financial system.  Furthermore, the specific training guidelines 
for administering the drug ensure an easy calculation of employee time 
and cost for knowing how to use it. 
One caveat is that naloxone-related costs may be both over- and under-
inclusive with respect to actual opioid overdoses, as explained by Hall 
                                                          
 382.   DIV. OF AGING SERVS., GA. DEP’T OF HUM. SERVS., A GUIDE TO FUNERAL HOMES, 
CREMATORIES AND CEMETERIES 8–9 (2011), http://medicalboard.georgia.gov/sites/aging. 
georgia.gov/files/imported/DHR-DAS/DHR-DAS_Publications/A%20Guide%20to%20Funeral%20 
Homes-2011%20FINAL%204-29.pdf [https://perma.cc/P8NU-MJNU] (explaining that the county 
may cover burial expenses if the decedent is a “pauper and destitute of the means of paying for decent 
interment.”). 
 383.   See supra Section IV.A. 
 384.   J. Brian Charles, Beyond Books: How Libraries Are the Latest Front in the Opioid Fight, 
GOVERNING (June 12, 2018), http://www.governing.com/topics/health-human-services/gov-libraries-
opioid-epidemic-lc.html; Corey S. Davis, et al., Expanded Access to Naloxone Among Firefighters, 
Police Officers, and Emergency Medical Technicians in Massachusetts, 104 AM. J. OF PUB. HEALTH 
e7, e8 (Aug. 2014), https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC4103249/pdf/AJPH. 
2014.302062.pdf [https://perma.cc/5MFR-6LHM]; Soumya Karlamangla, Police Use of Naloxone 
Saved a Dozen Who Overdosed in Chico, Calif., VALLEY NEWS (Jan. 20, 2019), 
https://www.vnews.com/The-drug-that-saved-the-people-who-overdosed-in-Chico-22908941 
[https://perma.cc/37Q9-SP8Q]. 
 385.   Hall County Library, Hall County Fire Services/EMS, Grady EMS (serving Decatur 
County), and Athens-Clarke County Police Department reported stocking naloxone and training staff 
to use it.  Telephone interview with Lisa MacKinney, Director, Hall County Library (Aug. 13, 2018); 
Telephone Interview with Randy Williams, Director of Operations, Randolph County – Grady EMS 
(Aug. 1, 2018); Telephone Interview with Garry Epps, Lieutenant, Drug Task Force, Christopher 
Nichols, Lieutenant, Office of Professional Standards and Recruitment, Benjamin Dickerson, 
Lieutenant, Career Development & Training Unit, Athens-Clarke County Police Department (Aug. 9, 
2018); Telephone Interview with Scott Bowden, Christie Grice, Division Chief, Emergency Medical 
Services, and Jerry Smith, Assistant Chief, Hall County Fire Services/EMS (Aug. 24, 2018). 
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County EMS.386  That is because their protocol, adopted based on national 
standards, calls for naloxone administration only if the patient is 
unconscious and has a blocked airway.387  Thus, there may be cases where 
a patient actually was in cardiac arrest, unrelated to drug overdose, but 
nevertheless receives naloxone.  Likewise, there may be patients who have 
overdosed, including on opioids, but do not receive naloxone because they 
are still conscious.  One reason for the relatively conservative protocol is 
that the immediate withdrawal effect of naloxone can cause agitation and 
aggression; thus, avoiding administration on conscious patients may be 
safer for the patient and emergency responders.388  The Hall County EMS 
personnel interviewed suggested that other departments, such as police, 
are more liberal in their naloxone use.389  Even if naloxone administration 
exceeds actual opioid-related overdoses, it still could be fairly argued that 
the costs are a result of the opioid epidemic. 
For two of the services we researched, the benefit-received model for 
providing government services does apply: emergency medical services 
(EMS) and hospital care.  These services already bill patients via health 
insurance (private or public) and track uncompensated care, and, 
consequentially, have systems in place for tracking costs related to 
particular patient diagnoses or interventions, namely, the ICD-10 codes 
described above in other cost studies.  To track opioid-related costs, EMS 
providers and hospitals simply would need to access existing billing and 
coding records in their data management systems.  That said, the 
specificity and accuracy of data entries could pose a limit on the ease of 
collecting these data.  EMS, for example, may not specify more than 
“suspected overdose,” without indicating the drug type or types.390  
Although a toxicology screen may be performed at the hospital when the 
patient arrives, there is no reason intrinsic to the provision of emergency 
medical treatment and transport services to report those results back to the 
EMS unit.  EMS is indeed a cost borne by local governments, even if the 
                                                          
 386.   Telephone Interview with Scott Bowden, Christie Grice, Division Chief, Emergency 
Medical Services, and Jerry Smith, Assistant Chief, Hall County Fire Services/EMS (Aug. 24, 2018). 
 387.   Id.  
 388.   Id.; Daniel P. Wermeling, Review of Naloxone Safety for Opioid Overdose: Practical 
Considerations for New Technology and Expanded Public Access, 6 THERAPEUTIC ADVANCES IN 
DRUG SAFETY 20, 21 (2015), https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC4308412/ 
pdf/10.1177_2042098614564776.pdf [https://perma.cc/6C8Q-F53G] (internal citation omitted) 
(noting that patients “undergoing acute opioid withdrawal . . . will be agitated as they are being revived 
with naloxone, thus increasing the risk of an injury to the provider.”). 
 389.   Telephone Interview with Scott Bowden, Christie Grice, Division Chief, Emergency 
Medical Services, and Jerry Smith, Assistant Chief, Hall County Fire Services/EMS (Aug. 24, 2018). 
 390.   Telephone Interview with Randy Williams, Director of Operations, Decatur-Grady 911 
(Aug. 1, 2018). 
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subsequent hospital emergency department or acute care services are not. 
Even with the possible service-specific coding data, the bulk of 
opioid-related EMS and hospital services will be funded through sources 
other than city and county governments.  Patients may have private 
insurance (through employers or other individual and small-group market 
plans) or government health insurance (through Medicare, Medicaid, or 
federal or state employee health plans) that covers most of the cost of 
services provided.391  To the extent those payors undercompensate, 
hospitals already have systems in place for addressing the shortfall, which 
rarely has financial implications for local governments.392  Even in the 
case of opioid-affected infants specifically identified in the local 
government plaintiffs’ complaints, they would almost certainly qualify for 
Medicaid coverage, a program that is jointly funded by states and the 
federal government, but not cities and counties.393 
We discuss jail costs more fully below under the “medium” category, 
but any hospital costs (as opposed to on-site jail infirmary) for inmates 
typically are billed directly to the county, we learned.394  Even if the inmate 
is Medicaid or Medicare eligible, those third-party payors are not billed (a 
point of some controversy between jail and county administration, it 
seems).395  Thus, if an inmate receives emergency medical treatment, 
hospital-based detox, or other drug treatment services at the hospital 
instead of at the jail, those costs would likely be easy to identify through 
CPT codes as above.  Those costs are discrete but likely fairly modest for 
any given county. 
It is possible that patients utilizing EMS or hospital services are city 
or county employees, in which case those and any other associated 
treatment (e.g., outpatient treatment, counseling and therapy, recovery 
assistance) would be a cost to the local government if the employee is 
covered by an employee health plan or workers compensation.  For this 
reason, we included heads of Human Resources departments for the three 
counties in our interviews.396  For government employees, some opioid-
                                                          
 391.   Id.  
 392.   Telephone Interview with Jim Lambert, CEO, Memorial Hospital and Manor, Hospital 
Authority, Decatur County (July 26, 2018). 
 393.   Financial Management, MEDICAID.GOV, https://www.medicaid.gov/medicaid/finance/ 
[https://perma.cc/H4AC-8MAL] (last visited Apr. 22, 2019). 
 394.   Telephone Interview with Garry Epps, Lieutenant, Drug Task Force, Christopher Nichols, 
Lieutenant, Office of Professional Standards and Recruitment, Benjamin Dickerson, Lieutenant, 
Career Development & Training Unit, Athens-Clarke County Police Department (Aug. 9, 2018); 
Telephone Interview with Tommy York, Jail Commander, Athens-Clarke County (Aug. 10, 2018). 
 395.   Id.  
 396.   Telephone Interview with Michelle West, Accounting Manager, Human Resources for 
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related costs are easily calculated while others would be more difficult to 
capture.  City and county Human Resources departments can gather 
employee medical costs related to opioid-related drug treatment, drug 
overdose, and other mental health and substance abuse benefits, assuming 
that medical billing records are coded by drug type.397  Local governments 
may self-insure or purchase their employee health plans and workers’ 
compensation coverage, but the service-benefit recordkeeping would be 
the same. 
For example, ICD-10-CM codes from category T40 (overdose) denote 
the specific substance relating to the overdose, the intent of the overdose 
(accidental, intentional self-harm, assault, and undetermined), and the type 
of encounter (i.e., initial, subsequent, or sequela).398  Category F11 denotes 
use, abuse, or dependence, and captures associated complications 
including, for example, delirium, mood disorder, sleep disorder, 
withdrawal.399  Other related conditions commonly associated with 
opioids include acute respiratory failure400, acute kidney failure401, 
coma402, liver failure, and constipation.403  Local governments also know 
how much they pay for employees’ opioid medications covered by the 
employee health plan.404  They also could track when certain employees 
are unable to work because of an opioid prescription, e.g., a sanitation 
worker who cannot drive a garbage truck because he is taking opioids 
following minor surgery.  The costs associated with that lost productivity 
                                                          
Decatur County (July 23, 2018); Telephone Interview with Traci Mason, Benefits and Wellness 
Administrator for Athens-Clarke County (Aug. 7, 2018).  
 397.   Id.  
 398.   Poisoning by, Adverse Effect of and Underdosing of Narcotics and Psychodysleptics 
(Hallucinogens), AAPC CODER, https://coder.aapc.com/icd-10-codes/T40 [https://perma.cc/8FPV-
E6GC] (last visited Apr. 22, 2019). 
 399.   ICD-10 Code for Opioid Related Disorders F11, AAPC CODER, https://coder.aapc.com/icd-
10-codes/F11 [https://perma.cc/VB75-ZGZB] (last visited Apr. 22, 2019). 
 400.   Rajnish K. Gupta, MD & David A. Edwards, MD, PhD, Monitoring for Opioid-Induced 
Respiratory Depression 32 J. ANESTHESIA PATIENT SAFETY FOUND. NEWSL. 70, 70 (Feb. 2018), 
https://www.apsf.org/article/monitoring-for-opioid-induced-respiratory-depression/ [https://perma. 
cc/H9JM-JSTG]. 
 401.   Mary Mallappallil et. al, What Do We Know About Opioids and the Kidney?, 18(1) INT. J. 
MOL. SCI. 1, 4 (Jan. 2017), https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC5297852/ 
[https://perma.cc/PQW5-P5V8]. 
 402.   Will Dane et. al, The Solution to Opioids is Treatment, BRAIN INJ. ASS’N OF AM., 
https://www.biausa.org/public-affairs/media/the-solution-to-opioids-is-treatment [https://perma.cc/ 
JQK4-PV2A] (last visited Apr. 22, 2019).  
 403.   Opioid Use Disorder, AM. PSYCHIATRIC ASS’N (Nov. 2018), https://www.psychiatry.org/ 
patients-families/addiction/opioid-use-disorder/opioid-use-disorder [https://perma.cc/2875-DRJA] 
(last visited Apr. 22, 2019).  
 404.   Telephone Interview with Michelle West, Accounting Manager, Human Resources for 
Decatur County (July 23, 2018); Telephone Interview with Traci Mason, Benefits and Wellness 
Administrator for Athens-Clarke County (Aug. 7, 2018). 
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would appear as sick leave. 
In some instances, local government provide grants or subsidies to the 
safety net hospitals that serve their communities.  Our interviews 
suggested that county indigent care grants are the exception, not the norm.  
In Georgia, it is entirely within the discretion of counties whether to 
provide indigent care funds to their safety net hospitals.405  Atlanta’s 
Grady Health Systems receives funds from Fulton and Dekalb counties in 
metro Atlanta.  Northeast Georgia Health System, which has the second 
busiest emergency room in the state,406 after Grady, is the safety net 
provider for Hall county.  It receives no local government funding from 
any of the counties that it serves.  Even when grants are extended, the city 
or county does not directly cover the costs of medical service but only 
subsidizes them; thus, determining the government’s opioid-related costs 
requires additional steps.  For example, suppose a government subsidizes 
its local hospital for indigent care by giving the hospital $500,000 
annually.  The hospital first would need to sum all the costs related to 
indigent care, and then isolate those indigent care patients that had opioid-
related costs.  The percentage of opioid-related indigent care costs would 
be multiplied to the subsidy of $500,000 to determine the county’s opioid-
related damages.  A hypothetical calculation is below. 
Fig. 2: Hypothetical Calculation of Hospital Indigent Care Costs 
County indigent care grant: $500,000 
Total hospital indigent care costs: $1.5 million 
Indigent care costs related to opioids: $30,000 
Percentage of indigent care costs related to opioids: 2% 
_______________________________________ 
($500,000) (2%) = $10,000 (county costs for indigent opioid care) 
Finally, any opioid-related grants or spending specifically allocated to 
local drug treatment centers grants or other facilities should also be easy 
                                                          
 405.   See David Wickert, Fulton could cut spending on Grady by $25 million, ACJ (Nov. 19, 
2013), https://www.ajc.com/news/fulton-could-cut-spending-grady-million/b6sxS2q5YioFW9Pg6X 
m5aN/ [https://perma.cc/L8NM-FEE2]. 
 406.   Courtney O’Neal-Hill, Top of the List: Atlanta’s Largest Hospitals and Georgia’s Top 
HMOs, Atlanta Business Chronicle (Oct. 28, 2016, 6:00 AM), https://www.bizjournals.com/ 
atlanta/news/2016/10/28/top-of-the-list-atlantas-largest-hospitals-and.html. 
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to track.  For example, the Hall County Treatment Center has grants 
specifically for MAT, the amounts of which could be readily identified as 
opioid-related spending.407  Other Community Development Block Grants 
(CBDG)408 would be easy to quantify, if dedicated to opioids.  If geared 
toward drug treatment more generally, however, additional research would 
have to be conducted to identify the portion of the grantee’s work was in 
the service of those with opioid use disorders and addiction.  To capture 
these types of costs, we included local government finance department 
representatives in our interviews because any city or county grants would 
be managed there.409 
In sum, our qualitative interview results suggest that the “easy” 
category is smaller than we anticipated, presenting clear challenges for 
plaintiffs and their attorneys in demonstrating damages in the lawsuits, as 
well as for local governments deciding on resources to allocate to the 
opioid epidemic.  With respect to the litigation, there seems to be very little 
cost or other downsides for cities and counties to join the MDL.  Plaintiffs’ 
attorneys front the costs, present ready-to-file complaints, and offer the 
promise of “free” money to budget-strapped local governments.  But as 
the discovery and settlement process unfolds in Judge Polster’s MDL and 
other courts, local governments may be struggling to respond to discovery 
and other requests.  Indeed, a group of cities suing in Connecticut recently 
were dismissed on standing grounds for failing to demonstrate cognizable 
injury.410  Predictably, other local government plaintiffs will meet similar 
challenges, on standing or other grounds, as these cases proceed. 
2. Medium to Quantify 
The “medium” category includes costs that take more effort to 
quantify and those for which the ease of determining specific amounts may 
                                                          
 407.   Telephone Interview with Nancy Smallwood, Grants Manager, Joy Walker, Housing 
Information Specialist, and Zachary T. Propes, Financial Services Director, Hall County Financial 
Services (Aug. 24, 2018).   
 408.   Community Development Block Grants (CDBG), GA. DEP’T OF CMTY. AFF., 
https://www.dca.ga.gov/community-economic-development/funding-programs/community-
development-block-grants-cdbg  [https://perma.cc/BE3U-L9TS] (last visited Apr. 14, 2019). 
 409.   Telephone Interview with Nancy Smallwood, Grants Manager, Joy Walker, Housing 
Information Specialist, and Zachary T. Propes, Financial Services Director, Hall County Financial 
Services (Aug. 24, 2018).   
 410.   See Cities Appeal Dismissal of Lawsuits Against Opioid Makers, ASSOCIATED PRESS (Jan. 
23, 2019), https://www.apnews.com/aae6b967e1a547e9b3f2dcccc534de42 [https://perma.cc/QLQ7-
G4Y2] (“Judge Thomas Moukawsher in Hartford ruled Jan. 8 the lawsuits are not allowed because 
they were not filed as government enforcement actions authorized by state public interest laws. . . . 
[concluding] opioid manufacturers cannot be held responsible to municipalities for indirect harms 
from the opioid crisis.”); see also Schott, supra note 370. 
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vary depending on a jurisdiction’s particular recordkeeping practices.  Our 
“medium” category includes jails, county attorneys (prosecutors and 
public defenders) and courts, parks and recreation, and police (both drug 
enforcement and code enforcement authorities).  Some of the additional 
effort would be retrospective, culling through records to identify historical 
costs not otherwise captured.  Some would be prospective, putting in place 
tracking software or other systems, or creating feedback loops, such as the 
suggestion above for hospital toxicology screens to be reported back to 
EMS.  One of our follow-on projects for this qualitative research is to 
develop those sorts of systems and train local governments on their use, 
work that is very much in keeping with the service and outreach mission 
of the University of Georgia, and similarly situated land-grant 
universities.411 
One example of “medium” costs that could be tracked with some 
additional steps include jail costs.412  The ability to track opioid-related 
effort will be “easy” or “medium” depending on whether the sheriff tracks 
why a person is incarcerated in a way that allows a retrospective search of 
the data.  Jails may or may not record the criminal code corresponding to 
the arrest or otherwise update intake data following plea or conviction.  
Even if data more specific than “DUI” or “possession” is recorded, it may 
not be in an easily searchable database, requiring a time-intensive review 
of records.  City and county jail populations include a mix of pre-trial 
detainees (the majority) and convicted inmates (serving sentences for 
misdemeanors and sometimes serving shorter felony sentences not 
transferred to a state facility). 
If the jail does record reasons for incarceration, then a similar 
calculation to the courts’ costs example above could be done.413  The 
average per-inmate cost (i.e., roughly $45/day/per inmate in Athens-
Clarke County)414 could be multiplied by the number of opioid-related 
incarcerations.  Absent those data, jails at least could determine prisoner 
                                                          
 411.   The Mission of the University of Georgia, UNIV. OF GA., https://www.uga.edu/mission.php 
[https://perma.cc/TM4Q-NESZ] (last visited Apr. 22, 2019).  
 412.   See generally About GDC, GA. DEP’T OF CORR., http://www.dcor.state.ga.us/ 
AboutGDC/About [https://perma.cc/BH73-ZBSH] (last visited Apr. 22, 2019); see also CHRISTIAN 
HENRICHSON ET AL., VERA INST. OF JUSTICE, THE PRICE OF JAILS: MEASURING THE TAXPAYER COST 
OF LOCAL INCARCERATION 4 (May 2015), https://storage.googleapis.com/vera-web-assets/ 
downloads/Publications/the-price-of-jails-measuring-the-taxpayer-cost-of-local-incarceration/ 
legacy_downloads/price-of-jails.pdf [https://perma.cc/A2RM-6S5A]. 
 413.   See supra Figure 1. 
 414.   Telephone Interview with Tommy York, Athens-Clarke County Jail Commander  (Aug. 10, 
2018). 
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medical costs related to opioids, including detoxification, MAT,415 and 
any other associated medical and mental health costs.  Prisoners needing 
those services are already identified and the drug and medical costs are 
easily traceable.  If the detox occurs on-site, medical staff time can be 
calculated based on number of days in the infirmary.  If the detox occurs 
at the local hospital, according to our interviews, the county pays directly, 
on a cost basis, for any services provided to prisoners, as described above 
under the “easy” category.416 
Court administration, as discussed above, seems fairly easy to track as 
those administrative costs are directly borne by local governments.  The 
question becomes harder for other legal departments, including public 
defenders;417 prosecutors (which may include district attorneys, who 
handle felonies, or solicitors general, who handle misdemeanors in some 
larger counties);418 Superior Courts,419 which include Accountability 
Courts420 and, as subsets, Drug Courts and Mental Health Courts;421 
Juvenile Courts;422 other limited-jurisdiction courts, such as State Courts 
in some counties423 which hear misdemeanors, including DUI, and may 
also have separate Drug/DUI tracks;424 and Municipal Courts,425 which 
may hear code violations, shoplifting, marijuana possession, and other 
low-level cases.  Additionally, some counties may use Probate and 
Magistrate Courts for certain misdemeanors, other minor crimes, and 
preliminary matters and proceedings.426  The county Clerk of Courts may 
                                                          
 415.   See generally Jailed-Based MAT: Promising Practices, Guidelines and Resources, NAT’L 
COMM’N ON CORR. HEALTH CARE (Nov. 7, 2018), https://www.ncchc.org/jail-based-MAT 
[https://perma.cc/L3QV-ZNZP]. 
 416.   Telephone Interview with Tommy York, Athens-Clarke County Jail Commander  (Aug. 10, 
2018). 
 417.   GA. CODE ANN. § 17-12-23 (West 2014). 
 418.   Prosecuting Attorneys’ Council of Georgia, GA. GOV, https://georgia.gov/ 
agencies/prosecuting-attorneys-council-georgia [https://perma.cc/6STT-RGCK] (last visited Apr. 22, 
2019).  See also Telephone Interview with C.R. Chisholm, Athens-Clarke County Solicitor (July 31, 
2018).  
 419.   See generally GA. SUPER. CTS., https://georgiasuperiorcourts.org [https://perma.cc/6BG7-
NNU8] (last visited Apr. 14, 2019). 
 420.   See generally GA. ACCOUNTABILITY CTS., https://www.gaaccountabilitycourts.org 
[https://perma.cc/RQ9A-S8PR] (last visited Apr. 14, 2019) and COUNCIL OF JUV. CT. JUDGES OF GA., 
http://cjcj.georgiacourts.gov [https://perma.cc/LWY4-XW4N] (last visited Apr. 14, 2019). 
 421.   GA. CODE ANN. § 15-1-15 (West 2009 & Supp. 2013). 
 422.   Id. § 15-11-50 (West 2009); Id. § 15-11-28 (West 2009 & Supp. 2013). 
 423.   Id. § 15-7-4 (West 2009 & Supp. 2013).  
 424.   State Court, ATHENS-CLARKE CTY., https://www.athensclarkecounty.com/954/State-Court 
[https://perma.cc/Y4AS-NAGH] (last visited Apr. 14, 2019). 
 425.   GA. CODE ANN. § 36-32-1 (West 2003 & Supp. 2013). 
 426.   Georgia’s Court Structure, JUD. COUNCIL OF GA. ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE CTS., 
http://municipal.georgiacourts.gov/content/georgia%E2%80%99s-court-structure [https://perma.cc/ 
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oversee both the Superior Court and limited-jurisdiction courts.427 
For these various legal departments, opioid-related costs are hard to 
track and attribute to local governments for various reasons.  First, the 
funding is a mix of state and city or county dollars.  Funding for Superior 
and Juvenile Courts in Georgia is a mix of state and county sources, while 
the courts of limited jurisdictions are city or county-funded.428  Public 
defenders’ and district attorneys’ salaries primarily come from the state, 
although counties may supplement them.429  That said, the state public 
defender system funds only one Superior Court public defender per county 
and only a portion of Juvenile Court public defenders and defenders’ 
support staff.  Caseloads typically require additional public defenders, 
which are county-funded.  For counties with Solicitors General, the county 
pays their compensation.430  Thus, the first task would be identifying 
which cases were handled by which courts and attorneys, recognizing that 
cases may move among various venues and personnel as charges are 
added, dropped, or settled.  That disaggregation task alone would be 
daunting. 
Second, even assuming some cases could be identified as county-
funded, those employees typically do not track costs related to particular 
charges in the same manner as Court Administration, described above.  
Thus, local governments would need to implement new systems to track 
staff time for opioid-related cases.  Historically, local government legal 
departments have not needed to “bill” their time (in contrast to some 
private attorneys).  Accordingly, any attempt to capture data on opioid-
related cases specifically would require a cultural change.  These 
departments might retroactively compile those data by combing through 
old case files, which may or may not be electronic or term-searchable.  The 
Government Plaintiff Fact Sheet described above calls for ten years of 
historical data on court expenditures with respect to each category of 
damages.431  To create any historical dataset would require not only time-
consuming, tedious work but also assumptions about the amount of time 
spent on cases, or creating average time estimates for types of cases (e.g., 
pleas versus trials, single versus multiple defendants, single versus 
multiple charges, type of charge). 
                                                          
K5F4-E8VG] (last visited Apr. 14, 2019). 
 427.   See GA. CODE ANN. § 15-6-60 (West 2009); Id. § 15-6-61 (West 2009 & Supp. 2013); Id. § 
15-6-51. 
 428.   See Georgia’s Court Structure, supra note 426. 
 429.   GA. CODE ANN. § 17-12-25; Id. § 15-18-10 (West 2003 & Supp. 2013). 
 430.   Id. § 15-18-67. 
 431.   Fact Sheet Implementation Order, supra note 124. 
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If a tracking system were implemented, then the total time in a fiscal 
year dedicated to cases involving opioids would be divided by the total 
time spent on all cases to create an opioid effort, similar to the Court 
Administration calculation above.432  All that being said, a number of cases 
still might not be captured.  For example, the charged offense may not be 
drug-related, such as a non-violent theft offense, even though the offender 
suffers from an addiction and may enter treatment programs through the 
Drug Court.  In sum, the calculation of local government judicial system 
costs related to opioids, aside from Court Administration, would be 
challenging. 
Opioid-related costs for Parks and Recreation (sometimes called 
Leisure Services) departments might include cleaning up drug 
paraphernalia from homeless camps or other locations that opioid-users 
frequent.  The costs would include the city or county workers’ time and 
any special equipment and training to safely collect and dispose of the 
waste.  If police accompaniment is needed for safety of the workers, those 
costs would also be included.  For the three counties we interviewed, this 
had not become a significant issue, but reports from other parts of the 
country reveal that the problem does exist and may even be prevalent 
enough to warrant providing needle disposal containers in public places.433  
We include the costs in our “medium” category, for now, because the 
problem is not yet prevalent at least in the three localities we interviewed.  
Another potential cost for local government recreational facilities are 
public campgrounds, such as in Hall County.434  Enforcement issues might 
include drug paraphernalia clean-up, as above, and other rules 
enforcement, such as noise or other disturbances, overstaying time-limits, 
and evictions.435 
In a few discrete instances, law enforcement efforts related to opioids 
could be captured if additional tracking systems were implemented.  In 
Georgia, police are city departments and sheriffs are county departments.  
The local government funding source is clear, although state and federal 
enhancement is possible.436  In some cases, local law enforcement officers 
                                                          
 432.   Supra Figure 1. 
 433.   Kevin Miller, Portland Adds Needle Disposal Boxes in Some City Parks as Heroin Crisis 
Continues, PRESS HERALD (Sept. 22, 2015), https://www.pressherald.com/2015/09/22/portland-adds-
needle-disposal-boxes-in-some-city-parks-as-heroin-crisis-continues/ [https://perma.cc/WS2L-
FXPW]. 
 434.   Telephone Interview with Mike Little, Hall County Parks & Leisure (Aug. 7, 2018).  
 435.   Id. 
 436.   There have been proposals to enhance police but not necessarily sheriffs and their deputies’ 
salaries with state dollars.  Greg Bluestein, Panel Eyes $7 Million in State Funds to Boost Local Cop 
Pay in Georgia, ATLANTA J.-CONST. (Dec. 20, 2017), https://www.ajc.com/news/state—regional-
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may participate in drug enforcement efforts such as multi-county drug task 
forces.437  Their work is typically planned and targeted to arrest drug 
dealers and manufacturers, such as methamphetamine labs.438  Whether 
opioids are involved in an investigation may not be known until an arrest 
is made and the drugs are collected.  For example, the officers may build 
a case of known cocaine dealer only to also seize heroin when an arrest is 
made.  But, again, law enforcement investigators do not track the hours 
spent on each case.  Therefore, even with investigations and arrests known 
to be drug-related, law enforcement agencies would need to develop a 
system to track time spent on each case, as well as additional costs like 
travel.  Still, they would need to segregate resources spent on 
investigations involving opioids, which, in some cases, may require 
retrospective data culling and analysis, similar to the approach for 
identifying legal departments’ efforts and overhead related to opioids, 
assuming the local government costs could be isolated. 
Aside from those particular scenarios, law enforcement costs related 
to opioids will be challenging to track because those services, along with 
fire, emergency response, sanitation, public works, and other departments, 
are provided as public goods, not on a benefit-received model.  Public 
goods are those in which one cannot isolate the benefits of a good, 
resulting in the classic “free rider problem” and undersupply of these 
goods in the private sector.439  The classic example is fire protection which 
benefits not just the person whose house is on fire but also neighbors’ 
homes when the fire is extinguished.  Likewise, it is often impractical to 
isolate beneficiaries of a service and make them pay for it.  Can you 
imagine having a toll road on every street corner?  In essence, local 
governments and the public do not expect local governments to charge for 
services based on a specific cost or benefit received for their core services: 
police, fire, street maintenance.  Rather, the public’s expectation is that the 
                                                          
govt—politics/panel-eyes-million-state-funds-boost-local-cop-pay-georgia/F8pB3alhhKbib6BTkx4 
C5K/ [https://perma.cc/2KQV-SG6K]; Craig Schneider, Sheriff’s Deputies: We Face Highest Risk But 
Lowest Pay, ATLANTA J.-CONST. (Sept. 16, 2016), https://www.ajc.com/news/local/sheriff-deputies-
face-highest-risk-but-lowest-pay/9qCwAO7PcOMF61F7QyykFO/ [https://perma.cc/XA8Z-AW3L].  
Also, some local police departments may receive grants, including federal funds.  See Hilary Bitschek, 
Ga. SWAT Team Gets Over $700K in Funding, MARIETTA DAILY J. (Feb. 20, 2015), 
https://www.policegrantshelp.com/news/8311290-ga-swat-team-gets-over-700k-in-funding/ 
[https://perma.cc/QPQ7-MB44].  
 437.   See, e.g., Regional Drug Enforcement Offices, GA. BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, 
https://investigative-gbi.georgia.gov/regional-drug-enforcement-offices [https://perma.cc/T74Q-
FXAR] (last visited Apr. 14, 2019). 
 438.   Telephone Interview with Gary Epps, Christopher Nichols, & Benjamin Dickerson, Athens-
Clarke County Police Department (Aug. 9, 2018).  
 439.   See generally RICHARD A. MUSGRAVE & PEGGY B. MUSGRAVE, PUBLIC FINANCE IN 
THEORY AND PRACTICE 7–8 (1984); Gerald E. Frug, City Services, 73 N.Y.U. L. REV. 23, 25–35 
(1998) (surveying dominant theories and literature on city services as public goods). 
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city or county will provide those services at a level supported by the 
majority of the community.  Moreover, some users of a service—such as 
a jail or court system—are not the beneficiaries.  Rather, the public is by 
having a safer community.  In sum, local governments at their core exist 
to provide services where costs and benefits cannot be traced to individuals 
and, thus, have not developed specific user and cost tracking systems.  
Although such systems might be designed to better capture opioid-related 
costs, the implementation itself would require expertise and resources, 
personnel, financial, and other. 
3. Hard to Quantify 
The third category of costs, those that are very hard to quantify, was 
larger than we expected.  This category includes not only indirect and 
intangible costs but also seemingly straight-forward, identifiable costs, 
including emergency communications (i.e., 911 calls), criminal 
investigations, code enforcements, and city and county personnel costs.  
We discuss the surprisingly hard direct costs first then briefly identify a 
host of indirect and intangible costs. 
911 is a county-level service in Georgia, although some funding may 
come from the state, including a sales tax on prepaid phones.440  Calls may 
be coded as suspected overdose but not necessarily opioid-related.  Unlike 
law enforcement through a drug task force where investigative work is 
planned and focused on narcotics, patrol work is reactionary.  Officers441 
respond to 911 calls and initiate incidents based on observations, such as 
pulling over a driver who is weaving across road lanes.  After responding 
to a call for service, officers write a narrative, regardless of whether an 
incident report was made.442  While these incidents could potentially 
provide data on whether opioids were involved, most law enforcement 
departments use a form of electronic report-writing to speed the process 
for the officers.443  These data systems have general categories of crimes, 
                                                          
 440.   See Mark Niesse, Georgia 911 Agencies Mysteriously Lose $5 Million in State Funding, 
ATLANTA J.-CONST. (Dec. 19, 2017), https://www.ajc.com/news/state—regional-govt—
politics/georgia-911-agencies-mysteriously-lose-million-state-funding/Mb3NEkFyamAYJ0GuRq3 
PzJ/ [https://perma.cc/Y3TB-C8TS] (reporting that $5 million in state funding for 911 from $.75 tax 
on prepaid phones had seemingly disappeared). 
 441.   This explanation applies to police officers and sheriff deputies.  For this report, we use just 
the term “officers” for consistency. 
 442.   Telephone Interview with Gary Epps, Christopher Nichols, & Benjamin Dickerson, Athens-
Clarke County Police Department (Aug. 9, 2018). 
 443.   Cindy Coleman, How Incident Reporting Impacts Officer Productivity and Safety, 
POLICEONE.COM (Aug. 6, 2018), https://www.policeone.com/police-products/police-technology/ 
software/report-writing/articles/478769006-How-incident-reporting-impacts-officer-productivity-
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such as assault, robbery, and narcotics, that an officer checks to easily 
classify the reason for the stop or arrest.  Where narcotics are a factor in a 
service call, an officer may include the types of drug or drugs found in the 
report narrative but relatively few departments would have an easy way to 
quickly search every report to determine if opioids were included.444  
Other 911 calls may not even indicate suspected overdose, but simply that 
a person is unresponsive or unconscious.  Also, some 911 centers serve 
multiple jurisdictions, requiring a tracking system to identify calls for 
particular cities or counties. 
For 911 calls involving police and crime, as stated earlier, arrests 
involving opioids can be tracked through docket databases of the Clerk of 
Court.445  But applying only those cases to a calculation of law 
enforcement effort with narcotics (a broader category, a subset of which 
would be opioids) would understate the actual impact on the department 
because many officer calls do not result in specific arrests for opioids.  
Under Georgia’s safe harbor statute, a person calling 911 for assistance 
with an overdose will not face criminal charges nor will the person who 
has overdosed.446  Therefore, an officer can assist with an overdose call, 
including but not limited to administering naloxone, and neither the person 
calling nor the person receiving treatment will be arrested.447  In some 
cases, including a video that went viral on social media, the person calling 
may even be the addict’s dealer.448 
As discussed under the review of earlier opioid studies, opioids are 
undoubtedly a driving force for property crime as addicts commit those 
crimes to pay for their drugs.  Because clearance rates for property crimes 
are generally low (e.g., nationally, 19.2% in 2017 for larceny-theft),449 law 
enforcement at a local level often cannot say what percentage of property 
crime was specifically associated with narcotics, much less opioids 
                                                          
and-safety/ [https://perma.cc/Q3JT-A6BW] (noting that over two-thirds of departments surveyed use 
electronic police reporting software). 
 444.   See, e.g., Telephone Interview with Gary Epps, Christopher Nichols, & Benjamin 
Dickerson, Athens-Clarke County Police Department (Aug. 9, 2018). 
 445.   Telephone Interview with Betty Logan, Athens-Clarke County Clerk of Courts (July 25, 
2018).  
 446.   GA. CODE ANN. § 16-13-5(b) (2014). 
 447.   Id. 
 448.   Katharine Q. Seelye, et al., How Do You Recover After Millions Have Watched You 
Overdose?, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 11, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/12/11/us/overdoses-
youtube-opioids-drugs.html [https://perma.cc/M2H2-SGQC] (discussing viral videos of overdoses 
across the United States). 
 449.   2017 Crime in the United States, FED. BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, https://ucr.fbi.gov/ 
crime-in-the-u.s/2017/crime-in-the-u.s.-2017/topic-pages/clearance-browse-by/national-data 
[https://perma.cc/9PLY-4KX5] (last visited Apr. 22, 2019). 
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specifically.  Similarly, housing code and other city- or county-ordinance 
violations are hard to correlate with opioids as opposed to drugs more 
generally or a host of other socioeconomic, medical, and other factors.  As 
one code enforcement officer explained, their officers may be called out 
to a property or identify a property because of piles of garbage in the yard, 
noise, or other disturbances.450  They may investigate and issue a citation, 
only to be called out to or notice the property in a similar condition some 
weeks or months later.  Alternatively, the violators may relocate within the 
jurisdiction and have that property fall back into similar condition.  
Investigations may on occasion reveal the presence of drug paraphernalia, 
but they may not necessarily be opioid-related.  Moreover, the code 
enforcement officer may not have grounds for or exercise discretion in 
involving drug enforcement authorities in the incident. 
A host of other financial impacts on cities and counties will be very 
difficult to quantify.  As discussed above in the “easy” category, direct 
medical costs for local government employees may be identified by 
insurance billing records.451  That said, the Human Resources department 
may not know whether an employee is using prescription opioids 
appropriately or is abusing them.  If a local government employee is 
abusing drugs, his productivity almost certainly would be lower, but 
quantifying that cost to the city or county would be challenging.  
Moreover, there could be lost productivity due to a family members’ 
addiction, even if the employee himself is clean.  In theory, it might be 
possible to correlate some workplace injuries with prescribed opioids if 
the worker experiences reduced alertness, focus, or coordination due to the 
drug.  Perhaps the value of damaged equipment, worksite shut-downs, or 
project delays could be identified.  But, again, the process would be 
laborious.  In theory, a city or county Human Resources department could 
establish a system to track employees prescribed opioids, even 
appropriately following surgery or for chronic pain, and establish patient 
education or other interventions.  But, again, those would be costly to 
implement and track. 
Lost economic development and opportunities in opioid-impacted 
communities is another probable effect of opioids that is difficult to 
quantify.  A community may become known for having a high rate of 
opioid use disorder and thus be passed over by businesses looking to locate 
new retail stores, manufacturing facilities, or corporate offices.  The 
company’s concerns may include suspicion that an insufficient number of 
                                                          
 450.    Telephone Interview with Dennis Bechtold, Hall County Code Enforcement (Aug. 22, 
2018). 
 451.   See supra Section IV.B.1. 
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potential workers could pass a pre-employment drug screen, or that 
employees, once hired, would be less productive and more expensive to 
insure than in a different locality.  As explained above, lost productivity 
has been captured on various macro studies of the opioid problem.  But 
those results do not translate clearly to particular localities.  The effect of 
drugs on blight and depressed property values also would be difficult to 
trace to opioids specifically, much less to quantify. 
Lost opportunity costs also would be very difficult to quantify.  These 
opportunity costs relate to services that local government does not offer or 
provides at a lower level because resources are shifted to address opioid 
costs.  Examples of opportunity costs include police officers having less 
time to patrol, slower response times from EMS, foregone park 
maintenance, and non-opioid mental health services. 
Other intangible costs, including but not limited to loss of community 
well-being and safety, both perceived or actual; decreased quality of life 
and emotional well-being for opioid abusers and their families and social 
support networks; emotional and economic impacts of overdose deaths on 
families; and long-term impacts in terms of educational attainment, mental 
health, employment, and economic self-sufficiency of children from 
families affected by opioid abuse would all be very difficult to quantify.452  
In sum, in addition to certain direct costs—including 911, criminal 
investigations, code enforcement, and Human Resources—that will be 
harder to quantify than we anticipated, there is a seemingly indeterminate 
list of indirect and intangible costs of the opioid epidemic that cannot be 
attributed solely to the drug or easily quantified.  Those impacts, however, 
are real and substantial, warranting local government budget and planning 
attention. 
V. CONCLUSION 
This article has provided a detailed description of the opioid litigation 
brought by local governments, which was the genesis for our project.  It 
then surveyed existing studies on the financial impacts of the opioid crisis, 
noting their shortcomings in terms of quantifying costs for local 
governments, specifically.  Finally, it described our study methodology 
and findings, noting that local government opioid-related costs fall into 
three categories, under our rather pedestrian taxonomy—easy, medium, 
                                                          
 452.   CORWIN N. RHYAN, ALTARUM, THE POTENTIAL SOCIETAL BENEFIT OF ELIMINATING 
OPIOID OVERDOSES, DEATHS, AND SUBSTANCE USE DISORDERS EXCEEDS $95 BILLION PER YEAR 3 
(Nov. 16, 2017), https://altarum.org/sites/default/files/uploaded-publication-files/Research-
Brief_Opioid-Epidemic-Economic-Burden.pdf [https://perma.cc/C45Y-CDFC] (listing various 
indirect costs). 
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and hard, in terms of the ability to quantify them.  Our primary takeaway 
points are: (1) assessing local government plaintiffs’ damages in the 
lawsuits will be very challenging; (2) these challenges stem from the fact 
that local governments are not set up to provide or track costs on a fee-for-
service basis; (3) existing studies of opioid-related costs on localities 
operate at the macro level and do not support assumptions about micro-
level costs actually experienced by any particular city or county; and (4) 
those studies do not even attempt to include very real indirect and 
intangible costs, which may not be relevant to the lawsuits but are highly 
relevant to city and county planning. 
Given those points, we conclude by offering a few thoughts about the 
implications of the current study and our plans for further research and 
support for local governments in addressing the question of costs related 
to the opioid epidemic.  As noted, our project was designed to inform the 
local governments plaintiffs’ damages claims as well as local 
governments’ decision-making regarding policy choices and resource 
allocation to address the opioid crisis in their communities.  With respect 
to the litigation, local government plaintiffs and the MDL and other courts 
will need to more precisely identify truly local, as opposed to federal, state, 
school, hospital authority, or private costs.  A number of alleged damages, 
especially medical costs, will fall only minimally or indirectly on cities 
and counties.  Even for the “easy” category of costs, local government 
plaintiffs will need to expend resources to respond to the MDL discovery 
for ten years worth of information.  For the “medium” category of costs, 
cities and counties may be able to capture some of those costs with 
additional tracking systems, templates, feedback loops, or coding systems.  
One of our future plans for this project would be to work with select 
Georgia local governments—not necessarily the same ones interviewed 
for this study—to pilot those sorts of instruments and training modules.  
As noted above, local government recordkeeping and accounting is often 
rudimentary, especially in rural communities hit especially hard by the 
epidemic.  Thus, any assistance would likely be welcome.  Local 
governments will have to weigh the costs of expending resources to better 
track opioids costs against the benefits from a litigation settlement and 
other funding and planning aims.  For the “hard” category of cases, even 
more resource-intensive tracking systems could be developed for the 
direct costs, including 911, police effort, and Human Resources.  For the 
indirect and intangible costs, local governments may simply want to be 
aware of those as they make budget and other resource allocation 
decisions. 
This study was limited in scope and largely anecdotal in responses 
collected.  For further research, we would like to expand and formalize the 
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survey to additional local governments in Georgia, drilling down more 
precisely on the available data in those communities.  Additionally, 
comparative research of cities and counties in other parts of the country 
would be informative, especially given that many of the costs we 
excluded—child welfare, public health, and medical treatment costs—
might fall more directly on local governments in other states.  Other 
potential costs that we identified, such as solid waste and economic 
development, may have become apparent in other parts of the country.  
Comparing local governments with similar demographics (e.g., rural or 
urban, high opioid overdose rates, MAT or other evidence-based treatment 
in jails or treatment centers) also would be instructive.  By all accounts, 
the direct, indirect, and intangible impact of the opioid epidemic continues 
to accumulate across the country.  This preliminary study, informed by 
interviews with three Georgia cities and counties, provides a realistic 
assessment of local governments’ ability to accurately and fully quantify 
the toll the epidemic has taken on their communities. 
 
